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11.1 Introduction 
The Asian region is a promising region for creation of a joint interstate electricity infrastructure. It 
embraces the industrially developed (Japan, Republic of Korea) and intensively developing 
(China, India, Vietnam) countries. The distribution of and demand for the fuel resources for 
electricity production do not coincide geographically. In the last years a number of bilateral 
studies (Russia-Japan, Russia-Republic of Korea, Russia-China) have been carried out. The 
studies have dealt with the potential options of interstate electric ties in East Asia. There are also a 
number of conceptual studies on potential interstate electricity infrastructure in East Asia (Russia, 
Japan, China, Republic of Korea, KPDR, Mongolia), South Asia and Oceania (Vietnam, Thailand, 
Myanmar, Indonesia, Philippines, Kampuchea), India with neighboring countries. All these 
studies form a basis for interstate cooperation in the sphere of the electric power industry and for 
the increase of interstate electricity exchanges, which is beneficial for all the participants. 
 
At the same time each country encounters the problem of energy security. Energy security is 
the immunity of the country, its economy, society and citizens from the threats of 
impossibility to fully meet their energy demands by economically accessible energy 
resources of an admissible quality from the threats of energy supply interruption. An 
important aspect of energy security in any country is its energy independence that can be 
provided by diversified external sources of energy resources, including electric power. 
 
This Chapter deals with the answers to the following questions: 
• What are the views of different countries in the Asian region of interstate electricity 
infrastructure development? 
• Is the problem of energy security a limiting factor for interstate electricity 
infrastructure development in the Asian region? 
• What are the views of different countries in the region of the impact of this limitation? 
• Do the growing interstate electricity exchanges in the Asian region play an 
important role for increasing energy independence of the countries in terms of 
other energy resources? 
 
11.2 Energy Security as a Factor of the Common Energy Cooperation in East Asia  
Energy Security (ES) implies here protect ability of a person, society, state, economy from threats 
of deficiency in meeting their energy demands by economically accessible fuel resources (FR) of 
an acceptable quality, from threats of disturbances of stable and uninterrupted power supply. 
The indicated state of protect ability corresponds to the full meeting of the reasonable demands 
under normal conditions and to the guaranteed meeting of the minimum required demands 
11
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million t of oil products; about 66 million t of coal and 12 billion kWh of electric power. However, 
this export (as well as the energy co-operation on the whole) is oriented mainly to the countries of 
West and Central Europe and the European countries of CIS (Ukraine, Belarus, etc.). 
 
Group of 
Threats 
Threats 
Economic ● Shortage of investments. 
● Uncontrolled energy use by the economy. 
● Monopolization of energy markets. 
● Price disproportions. 
● Low technical level of energy equipment. 
● Weak energy-transport ties with energy imbalances of regions. 
● Excessive concentration and centralization in energy.  
● Weak diversification of energy supply. 
● Insufficient amount of energy reserves and stocks. 
● Leading growth of FR demand. 
 Socio-political ● Labor conflicts, strikes. 
● Political, ethnic conflicts, terrorist acts. 
● Ecological extremism. 
● Limitation of free flows of energy goods between the regions. 
● Conflicts between different levels of authorities, separatism. 
● Low qualification, discipline of personnel, carelessness. 
● Criminalization in energy sphere.  
 External 
economic and 
external 
political 
● High dependence of FEC on imported equipment and materials,  
disruption of delivery. 
● Dependence of energy supply to individual regions on external FR 
supplies. 
● Discrimination measures against the Russian FR. 
● Critical dependence of the Russian FR exports on conditions 
   of their transport. 
 Technogenic ● Ageing, wear of equipment. 
● Accidents, explosions, fires on the FEC objects. 
● Accidents, explosions, fires on the objects of other branches  
connected with the FEC objects. 
 Natural ● Natural disasters (earthquakes, storms, etc.) 
● Severe winters. 
● Long-term low waters, particularly multiyear ones, on the 
    rivers with hydro power plants. 
 Managerial-
legal 
● Inefficient economic and social policies, mistakes in their 
   realization. 
● Weak mechanisms of antimonopoly policy and regulation of 
    natural monopolies. 
● Incompleteness and imperfection of energy legislation. 
● Weak state control. 
● Excessive state interference. 
● Inefficient energy saving policy. 
● Poor management quality of enterprises, companies, corporations. 
Table 11.1 Main Threats to Energy Security of Russia 
under extreme conditions. In so doing, the reliable and guaranteed external supply of energy 
carriers is the most important component of ES for the countries and regions with insignificant 
reserves of local FR (for instance, Japan, Central and Volgo-Vyatsky areas of Russia); energy 
independence: capability to manage with local resources at a loss/decrease of external supplies - 
for the countries and regions with a middle level of provision (USA, UK, Povolzhie and Ural 
areas of Russia, etc.); for relatively well provided territories (Russia, Canada, Turkmenistan, Iran, 
West Siberia, etc.) the following four factors which also play an important role for the mentioned 
above territories are decisive in the ES support: 
 
a) Capability of the fuel and energy complex (FEC) to supply energy carriers continuously 
and in sufficient volume, creating energy prerequisites for stable operation and progressive 
development of the economy and maintenance of the adequate living level of citizens; 
 
b) Capability of consumers to efficiently consume energy, to limit energy demand, 
decreasing it, thus to prevent energy balance tension and deficiency; 
 
c) Balanced FR supply and demand with regard to economically feasible export and import of FR; 
 
d) Favorable socio-political, legal, economic and international conditions for realization of 
the above capabilities by FR producers and consumers.  
 
It seems to be a common practice that ES is considered an important component of economic 
security being in its turn one of the basic constituents of the national security of each country. 
 
Analysis of the up-to-date state and trends in the development of FEC and its industries as well 
as conditions of their development and functioning has allowed one to reveal a wide range of 
threats to energy security of Russia. These threats grouped in 6 classes are presented in Table 11.1 
(in more detail about the subject-matter, problems of ES and threats to ES (see [1-6]).  
 
The most important economic threats are sharp shortage of investment resources, entailing 
insufficient volumes of new capacities put into operation (3-5 times less than the minimum 
required ones), reconstruction and reequipping in the FEC industries; non-compensated 
retirement of capacities; sharp decrease in prospecting and, hence, a delay between increase 
in explored reserves, in particular concerning oil, and production volumes; operation of 
inefficient and deeply worn equipment. Mitigation of these threats to ES is one of the basic 
incentives to activate strategic efforts of Russia for formation of the common energy spaces 
in Europe and East Asia and its integration in them. 
 
Russia is still the major energy country (Table 11.2) and its FEC is the most important 
component of the economy (Table 11.3) [7,8]. 
 
Russia can fully meet its demands for fuel resources and supply their considerable amount for 
export. Particularly it concerns oil and gas. Table 11.4 presents corresponding data for the pre-
crisis 1990 year. Though the internal consumption, production of energy carriers and their export 
to some extent be considerably reduced due to the economic crisis, still the situation has not 
changed qualitatively. In 2003 Russia exported 224 million t of oil; 189 billion m3 of gas; about 78 
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in Europe and East Asia and its integration in them. 
 
Russia is still the major energy country (Table 11.2) and its FEC is the most important 
component of the economy (Table 11.3) [7,8]. 
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export. Particularly it concerns oil and gas. Table 11.4 presents corresponding data for the pre-
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to some extent be considerably reduced due to the economic crisis, still the situation has not 
changed qualitatively. In 2003 Russia exported 224 million t of oil; 189 billion m3 of gas; about 78 
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about 56 trillion m3. However these resources are mainly the forecasted ones whose exploration 
extent is low. As for the reserves in commercial categories, the fraction of ERR for oil is more than 
17.5% of that for the whole of Russia (basic reserves are in West Siberia); and natural (free) gas 
more than 20%, respectively [10]. In magnitude the gas reserves of ERR are about 5 trillion m3 
according to [10], the oil reserves (only in East Siberia) are about 1 billion t according to [7]. Based 
on these reserves potential oil production in ERR in 2010 is estimated at about 34-42 million t 
(with active participation of foreign investors). In the more remote future it can reach 70-75 
million t/year, the export resources will be about 40 million t. Gas production in 2010 in ERR is 
estimated at 30-60 billion m3, including about 20 billion m3 on the Sakhalin shelf. Export 
potentialities of ERR in the more distant future are estimated at 50 billion m3 /year [7]. 
 
Eastern regions of Russia possess the largest explored balance resources of hard and brown 
coals, more than 17 billion t. The economically efficient hydro power potential of ERR is 75% 
for the whole of Russia, i.e., more than 640 billion kWh, more than 135 billion kWh (33% in 
East Siberia and 6% in Far East), including the hydro power plants under construction have 
been realized. Possible scales of electric power production in ERR at the level of 2010 reach 
255-260 billion kWh/year at local consumption of up to 230 billion kWh (about 180 billion 
kWh in 1990) [7]. The difference forms an essential part of the export potential. 
 
The second factor of changing the priorities in the external energy policy of Russia is a 
growing role of the Asia-Pacific region, in particular of the East Asia countries, deficient in 
energy resources. There is a stable tendency in the world economy to turn this region into 
the most important center of the world economy. 
 
№ Project Capacity, 
million 
t/year 
Length, 
km 
Diameter, 
mm 
Investment, 
US$ million 
Project participants 
1 Taishet- Perevoz-
naya bay 
50 3885 1020-1220 5817 Transneft 
 Including: Taishet 
–Skovoro-dino 
80 2047 1020-1220 3430 Transneft 
2 Sakhalin-1 
(De-Kastri-Kom-
somolsk-on- 
Amur) 
12.5 207 500 500 Exxon 
Neftegaz 
Rosneft 
Rosneft-
Sakhalinmorneftegaz 
ONGC 
SODECO 
2 Sakhalin-2 
(Yuzhno-
sakhalinsk- 
Prigorodny) 
10 800 500 1000 Sakhalin Energy 
Investment Company,  
Ltd 
Marathon 
Mitsui 
Shell 
Mitsubishi 
Table 11.5 Prospective Projects on Construction of Main oil Pipelines in East Siberia and the 
Far East with Penetration to Foreign oil Markets 
Fuel Resource Fraction in World 
Explored Reserves, % 
Fraction of World 
Production, % 
Oil 13 11 
Gas 33 24 
Coal 20 6 
Table 11.2 Role of Russia in the World Energy (2003) 
 
Unit Percent 
In industrial production 31-30 
In receipts to federal budget 46-42 
In export 54-60 
In production investments 26-31 
In number of production personnel 13-14 
Table 11. 3 Share of Fuel and Energy Complex in the Structure of the Russian Economy in 
2002-2003, % 
 
There are two arguments in favor of diversification of the Russian external energy ties by 
their extension in the eastern direction. The first consists in the fact that the eastern 
territories of Russia (East Siberia and Far East) possess a sufficient energy potential for 
development of FR export to the East Asia countries. Whereas West Siberia meets local oil 
and gas demands, the main demands of European Russia and also exports these energy 
resources to the West, the East-Siberian and Far-Eastern oil/gas complexes under formation as 
well as the electric utility industry of these regions based on hydro energy and coal can both 
meet the local needs (and transmit a part of electric power from Kansk-Achinsk Fuel and 
Energy Complex to the West) and develop the eastern direction of the Russian energy policy. 
 
Energy Carrier Production Import to Russia 
Export from 
Russia 
Net 
export 
Oil, including gas 
condensate, million t 
516.3 16.8 210.2 193.4 
Natural gas, billion m3 640.2 31.3 212.0 180.7 
Coal, million t 
     million .c.e 
396.3 43.2 
28.3 
53.6 
35.2 
10.4 
6.9 
Basic oil products (diesel fuel, 
motor and avia-tion gasoline, 
engine fuel, fur-nace and 
marine residual oil), million t 
 
 
 
239.3 
 
 
 
10.1 
 
 
 
65.8 
 
 
 
55.7 
Electric power, billion kWh 1082.2 ... ... 8.4 
Table 11.4 Some Indices of the Russian Fuel Balance for 1990 [9] 
 
Two considered eastern regions of Russia (ERR) - East Siberia and Far East with a territory (10.3 
million km2) making up 60% of the whole country and population of 16.7 million people that 
produced 13% of GDP of Russia in 1995 possess the major reserves of natural energy resources. 
The initial potential oil resources of ERR within the shelf of the Far-Eastern and arctic seas are 
estimated approximately at 17.8 billion t; and those of natural gas are estimated approximately at 
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power system at implementation of electric power projects (Table 11.6). Realization of these 
projects will lead to replacement of some capacities of power plants, particularly thermal 
ones, in Japan, South Korea, China at the expense of construction of power plants in East 
Siberia and Far East, rich in hydro resources. Correspondingly the environmental situation 
in the East Asia countries is improved. 
 
The considered projects of EPS interconnection allow the countries-importers of FR to 
diversify their import at the expense of electricity, since electric power supplies can replace 
the shortfalls in supplies of some fuels. It undoubtedly strengthens their energy security. 
 
We believe that the objections to the considered projects and co-operation from the ES 
viewpoint of East Asia countries are the following: 
 
1. There is a danger of either monopoly position of Russia in FR supplies to the market of 
any country or its extremely large fraction enabling one to use these supplies as an 
instrument of economic or political pressure. But as is seen, in particular from comparison of 
the data in Tables 11.5 and 11.6 this situation is hardly probable. 
 
2. The interruptions of the continuous FR supplies due to insufficient political and social 
stability in Russia are possible. However, one can suppose with a high degree of certainty 
that by the beginning of the period of supplies under the considered projects the situation in 
Russia will become more stable. Besides, the regions of conventional FR supplies to the East 
Asia countries do not belong at all to the politically stable ones, taking into account growing 
fundamentalist tendencies there, interstate and interethnic conflicts, etc.  
 
Let us consider positive arguments in terms of ES of Russia and its East- Siberian and Far-
Eastern regions. 
 
1. The basic argument which has been already mentioned is overcoming (mitigation) of the threat 
(to ES) of deficient investments, possibility to get direct investments, credits for development of 
the Russian, first of all the East-Siberian and Far-Eastern energy resources in the amounts, 
sufficient for their export to East Asia, their supply to the internal market and for meeting the 
local demand for hydrocarbons, including creation of the appropriate transport and other 
infrastructures. Besides, the expected investments and revenues from the export should and can 
be used for updating and reequipping the FEC industries and enterprises, as well as other 
branches of the economy (especially in frames of energy saving programs), and for solving social 
problems in restructurisation of the energy sector in the eastern areas of the country. 
 
2. The possibilities for introduction of efficient technologies and equipment for solution of 
the problems indicated in item 1, for updating and reconstruction of the production 
capacities of FEC as a whole are extended and hence, the threat of its low technological level 
and deep wear is reduced (Table 11.1). 
 
3. A new stable market of the Russian FR is being formed. This fact is directly connected 
with the financial and external economic security of Russia contributing indirectly to 
provision of its ES. 
 
Import of energy resources is crucial for Japan and South Korea, since these countries have 
practically no natural fuel resources of their own. However, during the recent years Japan has 
been intensively searching for alternative gas sources, which could at least partially reduce 
dependence of the country on foreign supplies. In particular, the program for prospecting and 
development of the gas hydrate shelf fields near the sea coast of Japan has been elaborated. By 
now 12 hydrate-bearing areas of the shelf, containing about 6 trillion m3 of methane [11] has been 
explored. But the commercial exploitation of the gas hydrate fields is a matter of the distant 
future. China cfn be is important importer of fuel and energy resources in nearest future. 
 
Russia also pursues its economic interest in East Asia region. In this connection in different 
time joint discussions and work on a number of energy projects “Russia-East Asia 
countries”, which are at different stages of realization, were started. Some characteristics of 
these projects are given in Table 11.5. 
 
Having considered the subject matter and main incentives of the Russia-East Asia energy 
export-import co-operation it is necessary to estimate it in terms of energy security (of 
Russia and its partners) and partially in terms of economic and ecological security. 
 
Positive arguments for the East Asia countries consist in the following: 
 
1. Provision of economically beneficial balance of their energy supply. 
 
2. Provision of diversification of sources of hydrocarbons supplies: Russia, objectively interested 
in stable East-Asia market for its oil and particularly natural gas joins the conventional sources - 
countries of Persian Gulf, Africa and partly Southeast Asia and Australia (gas). In so doing the 
Russian sources themselves are also diversified (Sakhalin, Irkutsk region, Yakutia). 
 
3. Improvement of the structure of fuel balances of the East Asia countries by using 
environmentally clean fuel (gas) of higher quality and supplying “clean” (for these 
countries) electric power as an alternative to its production by the coal-fired thermal power 
plants of their own and on the whole as an alternative to development of coal technologies. 
Though this idea is formulated in terms of ecological security, it is important for energy 
security: firstly, the latter implies both the quantitative meeting of demand and acceptability 
of energy carrier quality (see above the ES definition); secondly, the considered 
improvement of the fuel balance structure reduces any energy feelings and movements in 
the society, ecological extremism - one of the major threats to ES (see Table 11.1). 
 
4. Extension of the possibilities for the East-Asian companies to penetrate into the Russian 
markets of investments, equipment, technologies and other goods and services. Generally 
speaking, this argument testifies to the advantages of the considered projects in terms of 
economic security of the East Asia countries. At the same time such penetration favors 
commercial success and development of energy machine building, R&D works in energy 
and associated spheres of activities of these countries, which is obviously important for 
strengthening of their ES. 
 
5. Improvement of the EPS reliability of the East Asia countries, reliability of their power 
supply and achievement of the other known “system” effects due to interconnection of 
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export-import co-operation it is necessary to estimate it in terms of energy security (of 
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3. Improvement of the structure of fuel balances of the East Asia countries by using 
environmentally clean fuel (gas) of higher quality and supplying “clean” (for these 
countries) electric power as an alternative to its production by the coal-fired thermal power 
plants of their own and on the whole as an alternative to development of coal technologies. 
Though this idea is formulated in terms of ecological security, it is important for energy 
security: firstly, the latter implies both the quantitative meeting of demand and acceptability 
of energy carrier quality (see above the ES definition); secondly, the considered 
improvement of the fuel balance structure reduces any energy feelings and movements in 
the society, ecological extremism - one of the major threats to ES (see Table 11.1). 
 
4. Extension of the possibilities for the East-Asian companies to penetrate into the Russian 
markets of investments, equipment, technologies and other goods and services. Generally 
speaking, this argument testifies to the advantages of the considered projects in terms of 
economic security of the East Asia countries. At the same time such penetration favors 
commercial success and development of energy machine building, R&D works in energy 
and associated spheres of activities of these countries, which is obviously important for 
strengthening of their ES. 
 
5. Improvement of the EPS reliability of the East Asia countries, reliability of their power 
supply and achievement of the other known “system” effects due to interconnection of 
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11.3 Energy Security in the Asia-Pacific Region  
Energy security may be achieved when a state is able to minimize vulnerability to resource 
supply disruptions, access reliably energy at reasonable and/or market-driven prices, and 
consume resources that least damage the environment and/or promote sustainable 
development. By extension of this broad definition, energy becomes a security concern 
when states are denied access—whether it is the actual resource itself or by way of volatile 
and/or unfair pricing. There exists a vast literature on the history, politics, and economics of 
resource consumption in the world, and how states may act in an effort to secure their 
needs. Relatively little is written, however, on understanding how, why, and whether 
energy—as the unit of analysis—triggers competition or cooperation among states at the 
national security level.  
 
By 2010, energy use in developing Asia (including China and India, but excluding Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand) is projected to surpass consumption of all of North America; 
by 2020 it is expected to exceed North American consumption by more than 36%. The Asia-
Pacific region will consume more than half of the world’s energy supply, and will emerge as 
the dominant energy consumer by the early next century. Some scholars argue that the 
region’s growing energy needs have led to new strategic relations with other parts of the 
world, especially the Middle East, and have raised new questions about the reliability of the 
international market system in providing predictable and affordable access to energy 
resources. 
 
What are the pressing energy issues of the Asia-Pacific region? Do energy needs pose new 
challenges to Asia-Pacific security? How important is energy as a source of tension between 
states, or are energy security matters considered "low politics" which have a higher 
tendency toward resolution rather than conflict?  
 
In an attempt to explore these and other questions, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security 
Studies held a one-day seminar on regional energy security on January 15, 1999. The specific 
purposes of the seminar were to assess the current and future energy outlook for the region, 
identify the salient factors that influence energy security, and evaluate whether new aspects 
of the energy scenario raise new security challenges. The seminar was organized into four 
sessions: "Outlook on Energy Supply and Demand in Asia," "Energy Constraints and 
International Politics on Key Asian States" (two case studies on China and India), 
"Comparative Perspectives on the Politics of Energy Resource Management in the Asia-
Pacific Region," and "Concluding Discussions: Lessons Learned." This seminar report draws 
on the papers, presentations, and subsequent discussions held during the one-day 
proceedings. It also incorporates the broader literature on the subject as it relates to matters 
discussed at the seminar.  
 
In short, discussions led to a general conclusion that the energy security debate of the 
nineties is less about energy, per se. Unlike the energy security debates of the 1970s and 
1980s, which focused on supply shortages as a source of conflict and competition, rivalry 
and competition over energy itself is a non-issue in today’s debate. In fact, some would go 
so far as to argue that the common challenge of greater external reliance on energy supplies 
among Asian states would create incentives to cooperate, not compete. The security 
4. Electric power effect, i.e. mutual effect due to interconnection of power systems that is 
similar to the described one for the ES of the East Asia countries (item 5) is attained. 
 
5. Development of the economic (energy) co-operation in the region, determined by 
performance of the considered export projects will promote implementation of more 
progressive forms of co-operation. Though this argument concerns first of all the economic 
security; support of the Russian energy machine building, design and construction 
organizations, associated with such projects is of great importance for ES of Russia. 
 
6. Realization of export projects reduces the social tension in Russia, especially in its eastern 
regions which is an essential threat to ES, since it allows one to raise the level of 
employment for the population, particularly the skilled workers owing to construction of 
energy objects and creation of the corresponding infrastructure, their servicing, production 
of materials and equipment, etc. 
 
Finally, the negative arguments (objections) in terms of ES of Russia can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
1. The most frequently expressed objection consists in the fact that the currently considered 
gas projects take into account the local gas needs insufficiently. In particular similar remarks 
concern the Sakhalin projects, since they mainly solve energy problems of the countries-
investors and on the territory of Russia meet local demands only and do not lead to a radical 
change to better in energy supply of the south of Far East.  
 
2. The threat of premature depletion of highly efficient fields of non-renewable natural 
resources (oil and gas), a failure to preserve them for future generations, and, hence, 
potential weakening of ES of Russia and particularly of its eastern regions in the middle of 
the 21st century seems to be serious enough. In fact, it concerns commensuration of the 
today’s effects (including those from the ES view point) and future losses. 
 
3. An extreme influence of foreign owners of the Russian energy enterprises on the decisions 
made by Russia in the energy sphere and on utilization of the strategic resources on the 
whole can form a definite threat while realizing export projects. This and partially two 
previous threats can be overcome by the thoroughly developed legislation, comprehensive 
substantiation of the corresponding agreements, state participation or state control at the 
regional and municipal levels, in the process of preparation and realization of agreements, 
maximum possible publicity and public control in the given sphere.  
 
4. Export of foreign technologies and equipment within the framework of energy co-
operation leads to a great dependence of Russian Federation on supply of spare parts from 
abroad. Licensing and arrangement of production of extremely important spare parts and 
units by the Russian industry including joint ventures, which are envisaged in the 
corresponding agreements, could contribute to elimination of this threat. 
 
On the whole it should be pointed out that the enumerated aspects, particularly those of the 
negative influence on ES are taken into account insufficiently in the currently considered 
projects. Elimination of this drawback is still an urgent problem to be solved. 
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on the papers, presentations, and subsequent discussions held during the one-day 
proceedings. It also incorporates the broader literature on the subject as it relates to matters 
discussed at the seminar.  
 
In short, discussions led to a general conclusion that the energy security debate of the 
nineties is less about energy, per se. Unlike the energy security debates of the 1970s and 
1980s, which focused on supply shortages as a source of conflict and competition, rivalry 
and competition over energy itself is a non-issue in today’s debate. In fact, some would go 
so far as to argue that the common challenge of greater external reliance on energy supplies 
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similar to the described one for the ES of the East Asia countries (item 5) is attained. 
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progressive forms of co-operation. Though this argument concerns first of all the economic 
security; support of the Russian energy machine building, design and construction 
organizations, associated with such projects is of great importance for ES of Russia. 
 
6. Realization of export projects reduces the social tension in Russia, especially in its eastern 
regions which is an essential threat to ES, since it allows one to raise the level of 
employment for the population, particularly the skilled workers owing to construction of 
energy objects and creation of the corresponding infrastructure, their servicing, production 
of materials and equipment, etc. 
 
Finally, the negative arguments (objections) in terms of ES of Russia can be formulated as 
follows: 
 
1. The most frequently expressed objection consists in the fact that the currently considered 
gas projects take into account the local gas needs insufficiently. In particular similar remarks 
concern the Sakhalin projects, since they mainly solve energy problems of the countries-
investors and on the territory of Russia meet local demands only and do not lead to a radical 
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resources (oil and gas), a failure to preserve them for future generations, and, hence, 
potential weakening of ES of Russia and particularly of its eastern regions in the middle of 
the 21st century seems to be serious enough. In fact, it concerns commensuration of the 
today’s effects (including those from the ES view point) and future losses. 
 
3. An extreme influence of foreign owners of the Russian energy enterprises on the decisions 
made by Russia in the energy sphere and on utilization of the strategic resources on the 
whole can form a definite threat while realizing export projects. This and partially two 
previous threats can be overcome by the thoroughly developed legislation, comprehensive 
substantiation of the corresponding agreements, state participation or state control at the 
regional and municipal levels, in the process of preparation and realization of agreements, 
maximum possible publicity and public control in the given sphere.  
 
4. Export of foreign technologies and equipment within the framework of energy co-
operation leads to a great dependence of Russian Federation on supply of spare parts from 
abroad. Licensing and arrangement of production of extremely important spare parts and 
units by the Russian industry including joint ventures, which are envisaged in the 
corresponding agreements, could contribute to elimination of this threat. 
 
On the whole it should be pointed out that the enumerated aspects, particularly those of the 
negative influence on ES are taken into account insufficiently in the currently considered 
projects. Elimination of this drawback is still an urgent problem to be solved. 
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increasing naval might. Calder maintains that China's strengthening naval presence and 
territorial claims to waters of the South China Seas, reflecting its own desire to secure 
shipping lanes for its energy supply and trading routes, will likely further heighten tension 
in the waters of Southeast Asia.  
 
One solution to the energy demand crisis in Northeast Asia is nuclear energy. However, 
growing civilian nuclear power programs raise the risk of diversion of nuclear materials for 
military purposes, as is widely feared in North Korea. Northeast Asia includes three nuclear 
weapons states (the U.S., Russia, and China), and Japan and South Korea maintain large and 
growing civilian nuclear programs, which further contribute to anxieties in the region. 
 
11.3.2 A Region at Risk: The Asia-Pacific 
The dramatic geopolitical shifts stemming from the end of the Cold War and the global war 
on terrorism in the wake of September 11th have resulted in an abrupt restructuring of the 
traditionally bipolar system of global governance that has served as the norm for 20th 
century. Of all the regions subject to the repercussions of this new geopolitical landscape, 
the Asia Pacific region has emerged as one of the key arenas. A convergence of new factors, 
ranging from the threats posed by Al Qaeda to the sweeping engagement of the U.S. 
military throughout the region, has endowed the region with a significantly enhanced 
strategic importance. 
 
The implications for the Asia-Pacific region from within this new prism of global geopolitics 
and a greater reliance on military security have also been deepened by several underlying 
characteristics. Specifically, the Asia-Pacific has seen a pattern of increasing insecurity in 
recent years that has exposed the absence of any regional institution capable of forging 
common and cooperative security. This pattern of mounting threats has been marked by 
three escalating crises: the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-
1999 and the recent North Korean nuclear crisis. There is also a danger of a fourth crisis, 
involving Chinese frustration with the intricacies of Taiwan’s political ambitions. 
 
This absence of a governing regional structure has only exacerbated the region’s 
vulnerability within a new post-Cold War/post-September 11th threat matrix. Although 
there has been some attempt to address this regional insecurity through existing regional 
organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the regional 
states still lack the political will, military capability and experience to adequately enforce 
security in any significant multilateral approach. And as the only substantive security 
architecture in the region is limited to the web of bilateral security treaties centered on the 
United States, there is a serious need for a new security regionalism. Such an effort can link 
Asian-Pacific economic cooperation to a regional security process and also build on the 
regional powers of Australia, Japan and South Korea, each of which have been recently 
“deputized” by the United States. Therefore, energy security may offer the most effective 
avenue toward this “securities regionalism,” especially given the genuine level of 
cooperation and shared interests in seeking adequate and secure supplies of energy. Such a 
need for regionalized security is also reflected in the less visible security challenges facing 
the Asia-Pacific region. These security problems are concentrated in the core of the region, in 
the very foundations of the still incomplete state- and nation-building process, and stem 
concerns, rather, arise from issues related to the access, transportation, and reasonable prices 
and distribution of energy, specifically, the changing patterns in trade, a greater reliance on 
the Middle East for oil and thus a greater reliance on open access to sea-lanes, and shifting 
strategic relationships. 
 
Overall, discussions were not pessimistic about the future of Asia’s energy security. The 
general sentiment seemed to be that the identified problems were not entirely unavoidable if 
countries applied a constructive use of diplomacy during tensions; shaped national policies 
based on facts – not perceptions – regarding resource potential in certain parts of the region; 
and made commitments to utilize relationships already in place, such as bilateral alliances, 
to explore energy security questions.  
 
Section 11.3 presents an overview of the energy security in the Asia-Pacific region [12-20].  
  
11.3.1 Why Energy Security in Asia 
The view that increasing competition for energy resources, a consequence of increasing Asian 
economic growth, is producing growing insecurity in the Asia-Pacific region is best proffered 
by Kent Calder in Pacific Defense, his 1996 analysis of the US role in the future of Asia.  
 
Calder argues that economic growth gives Asian nations the resources to strengthen their 
military might, but that it also results in rising energy demands, and the resulting need to 
secure stable energy supplies in competition with one's neighbors increases global insecurity 
and a region-wide arms buildup.  
 
Petroleum, coal, and natural gas continue to be in insufficient supply in Asia, which 
provides only 11 percent of global oil production and 4.5 percent of reserves. Japan, with 
half the region's economic output, remains 95 percent dependent on oil imports. The 
growing Chinese economy's hunger for energy will soon make that country a net oil 
importer despite its status as the top supplier (with Indonesia) of energy in Asia. And 
increasing demand among other countries in the region will intensify competition for oil 
supplies and raise insecurity about neighbors' plans to ensure a supply of energy.  
 
More important than rising Asian dependence upon Middle East oil-producing nations per 
se (an East-West center study estimates that Asia's share of oil imports from the Middle East 
will rise from 70 percent in 1993 to 95 percent in 2010) is the tension surrounding reliability 
of access to shipping lanes from the Middle East.  
 
Asia Pacific region use increased with the strongest growth (6.3 percent) in 2003. Among 
fossil fuels, coal grew fastest in 2003, with an increase of 6.9 percent, largely due to a 
reported increase of more than 15 percent in China. Chinese oil demand has also doubled 
over the past 10 years, leading BP's chief executive to conclude in his foreword that China 
"will be a major influence on the world energy scene from now on." 
 
The approaches to the Strait of Malacca (for smaller tankers) and the Lombok and Makassar 
Straits in Indonesia (for larger tankers) are surrounded by Southeast Asian nations 
(Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore), which control those straits, and adjacent waters with 
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military purposes, as is widely feared in North Korea. Northeast Asia includes three nuclear 
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on terrorism in the wake of September 11th have resulted in an abrupt restructuring of the 
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the Asia Pacific region has emerged as one of the key arenas. A convergence of new factors, 
ranging from the threats posed by Al Qaeda to the sweeping engagement of the U.S. 
military throughout the region, has endowed the region with a significantly enhanced 
strategic importance. 
 
The implications for the Asia-Pacific region from within this new prism of global geopolitics 
and a greater reliance on military security have also been deepened by several underlying 
characteristics. Specifically, the Asia-Pacific has seen a pattern of increasing insecurity in 
recent years that has exposed the absence of any regional institution capable of forging 
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1999 and the recent North Korean nuclear crisis. There is also a danger of a fourth crisis, 
involving Chinese frustration with the intricacies of Taiwan’s political ambitions. 
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organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the regional 
states still lack the political will, military capability and experience to adequately enforce 
security in any significant multilateral approach. And as the only substantive security 
architecture in the region is limited to the web of bilateral security treaties centered on the 
United States, there is a serious need for a new security regionalism. Such an effort can link 
Asian-Pacific economic cooperation to a regional security process and also build on the 
regional powers of Australia, Japan and South Korea, each of which have been recently 
“deputized” by the United States. Therefore, energy security may offer the most effective 
avenue toward this “securities regionalism,” especially given the genuine level of 
cooperation and shared interests in seeking adequate and secure supplies of energy. Such a 
need for regionalized security is also reflected in the less visible security challenges facing 
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the very foundations of the still incomplete state- and nation-building process, and stem 
concerns, rather, arise from issues related to the access, transportation, and reasonable prices 
and distribution of energy, specifically, the changing patterns in trade, a greater reliance on 
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countries applied a constructive use of diplomacy during tensions; shaped national policies 
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and made commitments to utilize relationships already in place, such as bilateral alliances, 
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provides only 11 percent of global oil production and 4.5 percent of reserves. Japan, with 
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se (an East-West center study estimates that Asia's share of oil imports from the Middle East 
will rise from 70 percent in 1993 to 95 percent in 2010) is the tension surrounding reliability 
of access to shipping lanes from the Middle East.  
 
Asia Pacific region use increased with the strongest growth (6.3 percent) in 2003. Among 
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11.3.4 Regional Energy Security in the Asia-Pacific 
Energy security in the Asia-Pacific remains a complex and multifaceted challenge, with four 
main strategic issues mandating coordinated action: 
 
1) Measures are needed to reduce Asian dependence on fossil fuel or to secure an adequate 
alternative supply to meet rising demand,  
2) The need to address the environmental impact of the region’s energy structure, as seen by 
the environmental repercussions from the heavy coal use in Chinese industries, for example, 
3) The necessity for ensuring nuclear security in the face of regional ambitions to expand 
nuclear power, and  
4) Specific policies to improve the vulnerable regional energy infrastructure and 
transportation networks, as well as safeguarding vital sea-lanes and “chokepoints.” 
 
As demonstrated by the set of four strategic priorities areas listed above, regional energy 
security in the Asia-Pacific requires a multilateral approach. There is a potential for regional 
cooperation, stemming from the convergence of national interests in the face of recent 
transnational threats. Much of these shared interests and threats have only been revealed in 
the aftermath of September 11 and the ensuing global “war on terrorism.” 
 
To date, the regional approach to Asia-Pacific energy security has been focused on 
petroleum security, conservation and the search for alternative fuels. Specific examples of 
regional cooperation are largely through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), and include a Petroleum Security Agreement, requiring ASEAN member states to 
provide crude oil and/or petroleum products for countries in short supply. Studies for a 
Trans-ASEAN Gas Transmission System and an ASEAN Power Grid have also been 
initiated aimed at ensuring a reliable supply of energy to the region, with some notable 
progress to date related to cooperation in natural gas use and energy management. 
 
Regional energy security was formalized as a priority issue at an Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Energy Security Initiative Workshop on “Elements of Energy Security 
Policy in the Context of Petroleum,” held in Bangkok, Thailand in September 2001. Dr. 
Piyasavasti Amranand, the Secretary General of Thailand’s National Energy Policy Office 
(NEPO), reported to the APEC workshop that the current imbalance between reserves, 
production, and consumption of oil within the region has elevated oil security as a major 
concern for APEC officials. Amranand stated that the total reserves in the APEC region are 
far less than regional demand, exacerbating the regional dependence on oil imports, 
especially from the Middle East, therefore, made energy security a key element in 
establishing economic development policies. 
 
Thailand has long been sharing information with the Asia-Pacific Energy Research Center 
(APERC) and other research centers, such as the ASEAN Center for Energy (ACE), and has 
also implemented other measures that have substantially enhanced the energy security of 
the country. Strategic oil stockpiling by the Thai private sector is one of the measures, but 
there is an inadequate government role in developing a state-owned stockpile. 
 
The 2001 APEC workshop also recognized the security of tanker traffic as a main concern. In 
an address to the workshop, APERC President Tatsuo Masuda explained that the 
from the fragility and weakness of these states. Coupled with the economic, social and 
environmental issues in the region, the complexity of these threats requires a multilateral, 
yet regionally based approach. 
 
11.3.3 The Economics of Energy Security 
In terms of pure economics, the outlook for energy security in the Asia-Pacific looks 
particularly troubling, with rising levels of oil consumption and an even stronger rise in 
demand, Figure 11.1. Some experts, such as Ji Guoxing of the Shanghai Institute of 
International Strategy Studies, contend that the Asia-Pacific region’s dependence on Middle 
Eastern oil may exceed 90% by 2010. While oil fields in Russian Siberia and Central Asia do 
offer some short-term energy relief, the lack of existing infrastructure to facilitate the 
transport of this oil poses costly political and economic challenges of their own. 
 
Aside from the dependence on imports from the Middle East, there is also a danger of 
tension stemming from such an oil shortage within the Asia-Pacific region itself. The 
growing demand for energy may strain relations between such important regional actors as 
China and Japan, for example, which may then engender a set of new destabilizing regional 
or international conflicts. But an even more immediate problem is the effect of oil market 
volatility on the region, with the sharp rise in oil prices putting particular pressure on the 
currencies of some crude importing emerging market countries and the dangers of soaring 
current account deficits and weaker economic growth. This also threatens to impact the 
record of growth that has served as the driving force for Asian stability and development 
since the end of World War II. And while Asia is seen as the most affected region, the surge 
in oil prices also threatens other struggling oil importers. 
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11.3.4 Regional Energy Security in the Asia-Pacific 
Energy security in the Asia-Pacific remains a complex and multifaceted challenge, with four 
main strategic issues mandating coordinated action: 
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Eastern oil may exceed 90% by 2010. While oil fields in Russian Siberia and Central Asia do 
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Aside from the dependence on imports from the Middle East, there is also a danger of 
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China and Japan, for example, which may then engender a set of new destabilizing regional 
or international conflicts. But an even more immediate problem is the effect of oil market 
volatility on the region, with the sharp rise in oil prices putting particular pressure on the 
currencies of some crude importing emerging market countries and the dangers of soaring 
current account deficits and weaker economic growth. This also threatens to impact the 
record of growth that has served as the driving force for Asian stability and development 
since the end of World War II. And while Asia is seen as the most affected region, the surge 
in oil prices also threatens other struggling oil importers. 
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energy sector has been mixed, however. Multinational corporations still consider the 
transaction costs in India’s energy sector to be too high.  
 
Coal and oil remain India’s primary energy source. Coal consumption has steadily increased 
in the last decade; India used 283 million metric tons (MMT) of coal in 1997/1998, or 6.5% of 
the world’s total consumption of coal. India’s coal usage is expected to double from 405 
MMT per year in 2001 to over 800 MMT by 2010. While India will continue to rely heavily 
on coal, its consumption of oil will steadily rise. India’s oil demand currently exceeds 1.75 
million b/d, and is the fourth largest oil consumer in the region after Japan (5.78 million 
b/d), China (4.01 million b/d), and South Korea (2.25 million b/d). Similar to energy 
patterns in the rest of Asia, India will consume a predominant amount of oil in the medium 
to long term. India imports about 700,000 barrels of the 1.7 million barrels it currently 
consumes per day. Imports are likely to increase to 1.5 million b/d by 2010, most from 
Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The bulk of its oil 
imports will continue to come from the Middle East.  
 
Natural gas is a distant third in terms of India’s current energy use, accounting for only an 
8.5% share of the country’s primary energy needs. Natural gas, however, could become a 
potentially important resource in the future. For instance, it was estimated that India faced a 
shortfall of 50,000 megawatts in power generation by 2000, but the country will continue to 
turn to traditional options to fuel its power stations, namely coal, oil, and hydroelectric 
power. LNG is not more amply used in India for two reasons: it is a scarce domestic 
commodity and its transportation methods over the mainland are poor. Forecasts of growth 
in demand suggest that 20-25 million tons per year of LNG could be imported into India by 
2010, limited mainly by the lack of import terminals to receive LNG shipments.  A large 
factor in predicting growing future consumption of LNG, however, is India’s close 
proximity to some of the world’s largest gas reserves, namely in Yemen, Qatar, Oman, 
Yemen, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Any growth in India’s share of LNG consumption will 
depend on the coordination of various agencies in India such as the state maritime boards, 
the Finance Ministry, port authorities, the Ministry of Petroleum, the Ministry of Power, the 
state electricity boards, national and state grids and India’s financial institutions.  
 
Given India’s energy interests in the Middle East, India has often taken positions contrary to 
the United States on Middle East issues. For instance, U.S. sanctions have delayed initiatives 
to import gas and oil from Iran and Iraq; but it is in India’s interest to support the lifting of 
sanctions. Longstanding difficult relations with its neighbors also complicate India’s energy 
security. For instance, the Oman-India deep-sea pipeline project, which needed to avoid the 
territorial waters of Pakistan, required the pipeline to be laid out at technologically 
infeasible depths. Another gas project, which would deliver gas from Iran through Pakistan 
to India, was cancelled because Pakistan would not permit pipelines to be laid on its 
territory or through the EEZ. Improvement in India-Pakistan relations is critical if huge gas 
reserves in the Middle East and Central Asia are to reach either country. However, 
persistent problems in this bilateral relationship have led India to adopt more costly 
alternatives for importing natural gas.  
 
combination of vulnerable transport from the Middle East and West Africa with the fact that 
tankers are getting smaller, while the number of tankers crossing the Indian Ocean to Asia 
triples or quadruples, necessitates a reduction of the risks posed by tanker traffic. Masuda 
specifically pointed to the need for pipeline infrastructure projects connecting Russia, China, 
Korea, and Japan, as a means by which to reduce this risk. 
 
11.3.5 Building Energy-Strategic Relationships 
 
11.3.5.1 China 
China’s interest in expanding its resource linkages with Central Asia, Russia, and the 
Middle East will be better integrated. The government plans to promote market penetration 
into these areas in an effort to secure oil supplies. Given the political environment of the 
Persian Gulf, China plans to choose and develop better relations with "niche markets" such 
as Iran and Iraq while maintaining traditional relationships with other markets such as 
Sudan and Nigeria. The Chinese government has also enhanced its relations with Arab 
producers in the Gulf and North Africa, where approximately 36% of the world’s oil 
reserves are located. In order to gain access to the Arab market, Chinese oil construction 
services and technical support units have been expanded in Kuwait, Iraq and several other 
Arab countries. At the same time, Arab producers are encouraged to enter Chinese offshore 
upstream and downstream projects. In the future, China plans to establish new linkages 
with Arab producers, which comprise sea shipments, land pipelines, and other investments.  
 
China’s past reluctance to see Russian resource development in Eastern Siberia has changed 
with its growing interest in the resources of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East region. 
Beijing expects gas imports from Eastern Siberia to double by 2010. Efforts toward building 
a strategic partnership between China and Russia have led to signed commitments in 1996 
for major oil and gas pipelines projects with over US$20 billion in investment requirements. 
Sino-Russian relations remain complicated, however, by political and diplomatic 
uncertainties. It is expressed concern that a Sino-Russian confrontation could emerge in the 
long-term as pipeline projects routed east-west from Central Asia to China may undermine 
Russia’s historical authority and control over resources in the region. Others raised the 
specter of possible competition among the United States, EU interests, China, and Russia 
over control of resources in the Central Asia/Caspian Basin area.  
 
11.3.5.2 India   
Coal and oil constitute India’s primary energy sources. Figures for 1997 indicate that the 
share of coal in total primary energy consumption was about 56.2% and the share of oil was 
about 32%, making up almost 90% of India’s total energy needs. Energy consumption has 
kept up with the pace of economic growth of about 6% since the post-reform period 
beginning in 1991. After the oil shocks of 1973, India’s energy sector became heavy 
controlled by the state. A number of foreign companies were nationalized, and a number of 
public sector undertakings started in the coal, oil, and electricity sectors. However, rapidly 
growing energy demand outpaced the public sector’s ability to provide adequate supplies. 
In an effort to attract foreign investment in the energy sector, the Indian government in 1991 
began loosening state control over the energy sector by implementing phased programs for 
deregulating coal, oil and gas prices by 2002-2003. Progress in India’s liberalization of its 
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energy sector has been mixed, however. Multinational corporations still consider the 
transaction costs in India’s energy sector to be too high.  
 
Coal and oil remain India’s primary energy source. Coal consumption has steadily increased 
in the last decade; India used 283 million metric tons (MMT) of coal in 1997/1998, or 6.5% of 
the world’s total consumption of coal. India’s coal usage is expected to double from 405 
MMT per year in 2001 to over 800 MMT by 2010. While India will continue to rely heavily 
on coal, its consumption of oil will steadily rise. India’s oil demand currently exceeds 1.75 
million b/d, and is the fourth largest oil consumer in the region after Japan (5.78 million 
b/d), China (4.01 million b/d), and South Korea (2.25 million b/d). Similar to energy 
patterns in the rest of Asia, India will consume a predominant amount of oil in the medium 
to long term. India imports about 700,000 barrels of the 1.7 million barrels it currently 
consumes per day. Imports are likely to increase to 1.5 million b/d by 2010, most from 
Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The bulk of its oil 
imports will continue to come from the Middle East.  
 
Natural gas is a distant third in terms of India’s current energy use, accounting for only an 
8.5% share of the country’s primary energy needs. Natural gas, however, could become a 
potentially important resource in the future. For instance, it was estimated that India faced a 
shortfall of 50,000 megawatts in power generation by 2000, but the country will continue to 
turn to traditional options to fuel its power stations, namely coal, oil, and hydroelectric 
power. LNG is not more amply used in India for two reasons: it is a scarce domestic 
commodity and its transportation methods over the mainland are poor. Forecasts of growth 
in demand suggest that 20-25 million tons per year of LNG could be imported into India by 
2010, limited mainly by the lack of import terminals to receive LNG shipments.  A large 
factor in predicting growing future consumption of LNG, however, is India’s close 
proximity to some of the world’s largest gas reserves, namely in Yemen, Qatar, Oman, 
Yemen, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Any growth in India’s share of LNG consumption will 
depend on the coordination of various agencies in India such as the state maritime boards, 
the Finance Ministry, port authorities, the Ministry of Petroleum, the Ministry of Power, the 
state electricity boards, national and state grids and India’s financial institutions.  
 
Given India’s energy interests in the Middle East, India has often taken positions contrary to 
the United States on Middle East issues. For instance, U.S. sanctions have delayed initiatives 
to import gas and oil from Iran and Iraq; but it is in India’s interest to support the lifting of 
sanctions. Longstanding difficult relations with its neighbors also complicate India’s energy 
security. For instance, the Oman-India deep-sea pipeline project, which needed to avoid the 
territorial waters of Pakistan, required the pipeline to be laid out at technologically 
infeasible depths. Another gas project, which would deliver gas from Iran through Pakistan 
to India, was cancelled because Pakistan would not permit pipelines to be laid on its 
territory or through the EEZ. Improvement in India-Pakistan relations is critical if huge gas 
reserves in the Middle East and Central Asia are to reach either country. However, 
persistent problems in this bilateral relationship have led India to adopt more costly 
alternatives for importing natural gas.  
 
combination of vulnerable transport from the Middle East and West Africa with the fact that 
tankers are getting smaller, while the number of tankers crossing the Indian Ocean to Asia 
triples or quadruples, necessitates a reduction of the risks posed by tanker traffic. Masuda 
specifically pointed to the need for pipeline infrastructure projects connecting Russia, China, 
Korea, and Japan, as a means by which to reduce this risk. 
 
11.3.5 Building Energy-Strategic Relationships 
 
11.3.5.1 China 
China’s interest in expanding its resource linkages with Central Asia, Russia, and the 
Middle East will be better integrated. The government plans to promote market penetration 
into these areas in an effort to secure oil supplies. Given the political environment of the 
Persian Gulf, China plans to choose and develop better relations with "niche markets" such 
as Iran and Iraq while maintaining traditional relationships with other markets such as 
Sudan and Nigeria. The Chinese government has also enhanced its relations with Arab 
producers in the Gulf and North Africa, where approximately 36% of the world’s oil 
reserves are located. In order to gain access to the Arab market, Chinese oil construction 
services and technical support units have been expanded in Kuwait, Iraq and several other 
Arab countries. At the same time, Arab producers are encouraged to enter Chinese offshore 
upstream and downstream projects. In the future, China plans to establish new linkages 
with Arab producers, which comprise sea shipments, land pipelines, and other investments.  
 
China’s past reluctance to see Russian resource development in Eastern Siberia has changed 
with its growing interest in the resources of Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East region. 
Beijing expects gas imports from Eastern Siberia to double by 2010. Efforts toward building 
a strategic partnership between China and Russia have led to signed commitments in 1996 
for major oil and gas pipelines projects with over US$20 billion in investment requirements. 
Sino-Russian relations remain complicated, however, by political and diplomatic 
uncertainties. It is expressed concern that a Sino-Russian confrontation could emerge in the 
long-term as pipeline projects routed east-west from Central Asia to China may undermine 
Russia’s historical authority and control over resources in the region. Others raised the 
specter of possible competition among the United States, EU interests, China, and Russia 
over control of resources in the Central Asia/Caspian Basin area.  
 
11.3.5.2 India   
Coal and oil constitute India’s primary energy sources. Figures for 1997 indicate that the 
share of coal in total primary energy consumption was about 56.2% and the share of oil was 
about 32%, making up almost 90% of India’s total energy needs. Energy consumption has 
kept up with the pace of economic growth of about 6% since the post-reform period 
beginning in 1991. After the oil shocks of 1973, India’s energy sector became heavy 
controlled by the state. A number of foreign companies were nationalized, and a number of 
public sector undertakings started in the coal, oil, and electricity sectors. However, rapidly 
growing energy demand outpaced the public sector’s ability to provide adequate supplies. 
In an effort to attract foreign investment in the energy sector, the Indian government in 1991 
began loosening state control over the energy sector by implementing phased programs for 
deregulating coal, oil and gas prices by 2002-2003. Progress in India’s liberalization of its 
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safe access to sea-lanes, reliable transportation, territorial conflicts, and attendant 
environmental security issues such as pollution. New sources of energy, such as natural gas, 
a more sophisticated and integrated energy market, and newly emerging strategic 
relationships have introduced new energy security considerations in the Asia-Pacific.  
 
11.3.7 General Notes 
1) Reducing dependency on oil has been a top priority in Japan’s energy policy since the 
first oil shock in 1973. As a result, the amount of imported oil as a percentage of Japan’s 
energy supply dropped from 78% in 1973, to 51% in 2001. However, the percentage of oil 
imports from the Middle East as a percentage of total oil imports has recently been on the 
rise and reached 86% in 2001.  
 
2) According to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2002, oil imports for developing countries 
in Asia are expected to increase dramatically from 4.9 Mbd (42% of demand) in 2000, to 24 
Mbd (83% of demand) in 2030. In particular, net oil imports for China alone are expected to 
jump from 1.7 Mbd (35% of demand) in 2000, to 10 Mbd (83% of demand) in 2030.  
 
3) The Japanese government has formulated a comprehensive policy, called the Hiranuma 
Initiative, which is aimed at maintaining energy stability in the Asian region. This policy 
was presented at a meeting of energy ministers from Japan, Korea, China, and the ASEAN 
nations at the IEF forum in Osaka, and was approved by all participants. The main points of 
this policy are (1) to promote cooperation in the development of natural gas resources in the 
Asia region, (2) to exchange information in emergencies, and (3) to cooperate with Asian 
countries in price negotiations with oil-producing nations.  
 
4) KEDO is an international organization which was founded in 1995 based on the Agreed 
Framework between the US and North Korea. Since North Korea’s admission that it had 
continued its nuclear weapons development program, the effectiveness of the framework 
itself has been called into question.  
 
5) Japan’s petroleum product tax per kiloliter is ¥1200 for gasoline, ¥570 for kerosene, ¥1270 for 
light oil, ¥2400 for low-sulfur crude oil, and ¥3410 for high-sulfur crude oil. Naphtha is tax-
exempt. In tandem with a 1972 policy of deregulation of fuel oil imports, a proportional tax 
was introduced to support refining near areas of consumption, and this high secondary tax is 
still in effect today. On imported fuel oil priced at ¥20,000 per kiloliter, the tax amounts to 
between 12% and 17%. In contrast, Korea imposes a uniform tax on all petroleum products of 
7% of the import price  except on naphtha, for which the taxation rate is 1%. 
 
Therefore, the imperative for energy security in such vulnerable strategic regions as the 
Asia-Pacific is paramount for global stability and development. The priority of this 
challenge for the Asia-Pacific region is also no accident, as it is the world’s fastest growing 
energy consumer, with projected demand to steadily surpass other regions for some time. 
But it remains to be seen whether this troubled region will be able to forge a collective and 
cooperative approach in the wake of the daunting challenges and demands posed by the 
global “war on terrorism” and an increasingly destabilizing unipolar world. 
India expects no major or sudden changes in its energy needs in the near future, assuming 
steady economic growth and successful completion of its liberalization program in its 
energy sector.  However, given India’s increasing dependence on foreign sources for energy 
resources such as oil and gas, the government is concerned about several potential 
developments that could affect India’s access to resources. Political instability in the Middle 
East, possible conflict between India and Pakistan, or potential tensions with China are all 
liable to negatively impact India’s access to foreign supplies. Given the political 
uncertainties, India seeks an adequate emergency response capability to possible 
disruptions in energy supplies, a well-functioning international oil market, and a regional 
forum for cooperation on energy matters. India supports the creation of a regional version of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) with the specific goal of improving states’ emergency 
response capabilities to possible future disruptions in supply. Views were mixed about 
whether an energy-specific regional organization would be feasible; it is argued that such 
cooperation seemed ambitious given that more immediate inter-state security issues 
remained unresolved between India and its neighbors. Situated adjacent to the world’s 
largest oil reserves in West Asia and along the route of the bulk of international oil trade 
moving from the Persian Gulf to East Asia and the Pacific, however, India is well placed to 
play a key leadership role in enhancing the "collective energy security" of the Indian Ocean 
Rim (IOR). 
  
11.3.5.3 Japan  
Japan, the world’s second largest  and Asia’s most powerful  economy, remains highly 
dependent on foreign suppliers for its energy resources. Japan’s primary energy sources 
today are oil, coal, and gas. Although Japan was heavily dependent on oil during the 1970s 
 its share of oil consumption exceeded 70% at times during this decade  it pioneered trade 
in liquefied natural gas (LNG), sharply increasing the share of natural gas in the country’s 
primary energy supply from 5% in 1980 to 12% in 1998.  Today, Japan is the world’s largest 
importer of LNG, accounting for 61.2% of total global LNG imports in 1996. Despite the rise 
in LNG consumption, Japan’s primary energy source is oil, which accounts for about 53% of 
its total energy needs, followed by coal (18%), nuclear energy (16%), natural gas (12%), and 
hydroelectric fuel (2%). Japan’s energy mix remains heavily oil-dependent because it 
possesses only incidental indigenous fossil fuel reserves and production. Its heavy reliance 
on oil is due to direct burning of crude for power generation. In terms of the outlook for 
Japan’s resource needs, the share of oil is expected to decrease while that of natural gas will 
increase, with the role of nuclear power remaining uncertain. Although electricity 
generation will be increasingly met by LNG imports, Japan’s consumption of oil is predicted 
to rise significantly, and a much greater amount of the resource will travel by sea, primarily 
from the Middle East. While still heavily reliant on oil, Japan in recent years has 
dramatically reduced its dependency from 77.4% in 1973 to 55.8% in 1995. Nevertheless, 
Japan remains concerned about the safety of shipping lanes.  
 
11.3.6 Traditional and Newly Emerging Regional Security Concerns 
Access to energy sources is a critical security issue for the Asia-Pacific region given the 
structure of its energy needs and expected future consumption patterns. Governments and 
security professionals continue to wrestle with traditional energy security concerns such as 
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safe access to sea-lanes, reliable transportation, territorial conflicts, and attendant 
environmental security issues such as pollution. New sources of energy, such as natural gas, 
a more sophisticated and integrated energy market, and newly emerging strategic 
relationships have introduced new energy security considerations in the Asia-Pacific.  
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1) Reducing dependency on oil has been a top priority in Japan’s energy policy since the 
first oil shock in 1973. As a result, the amount of imported oil as a percentage of Japan’s 
energy supply dropped from 78% in 1973, to 51% in 2001. However, the percentage of oil 
imports from the Middle East as a percentage of total oil imports has recently been on the 
rise and reached 86% in 2001.  
 
2) According to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2002, oil imports for developing countries 
in Asia are expected to increase dramatically from 4.9 Mbd (42% of demand) in 2000, to 24 
Mbd (83% of demand) in 2030. In particular, net oil imports for China alone are expected to 
jump from 1.7 Mbd (35% of demand) in 2000, to 10 Mbd (83% of demand) in 2030.  
 
3) The Japanese government has formulated a comprehensive policy, called the Hiranuma 
Initiative, which is aimed at maintaining energy stability in the Asian region. This policy 
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nations at the IEF forum in Osaka, and was approved by all participants. The main points of 
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Asia region, (2) to exchange information in emergencies, and (3) to cooperate with Asian 
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4) KEDO is an international organization which was founded in 1995 based on the Agreed 
Framework between the US and North Korea. Since North Korea’s admission that it had 
continued its nuclear weapons development program, the effectiveness of the framework 
itself has been called into question.  
 
5) Japan’s petroleum product tax per kiloliter is ¥1200 for gasoline, ¥570 for kerosene, ¥1270 for 
light oil, ¥2400 for low-sulfur crude oil, and ¥3410 for high-sulfur crude oil. Naphtha is tax-
exempt. In tandem with a 1972 policy of deregulation of fuel oil imports, a proportional tax 
was introduced to support refining near areas of consumption, and this high secondary tax is 
still in effect today. On imported fuel oil priced at ¥20,000 per kiloliter, the tax amounts to 
between 12% and 17%. In contrast, Korea imposes a uniform tax on all petroleum products of 
7% of the import price  except on naphtha, for which the taxation rate is 1%. 
 
Therefore, the imperative for energy security in such vulnerable strategic regions as the 
Asia-Pacific is paramount for global stability and development. The priority of this 
challenge for the Asia-Pacific region is also no accident, as it is the world’s fastest growing 
energy consumer, with projected demand to steadily surpass other regions for some time. 
But it remains to be seen whether this troubled region will be able to forge a collective and 
cooperative approach in the wake of the daunting challenges and demands posed by the 
global “war on terrorism” and an increasingly destabilizing unipolar world. 
India expects no major or sudden changes in its energy needs in the near future, assuming 
steady economic growth and successful completion of its liberalization program in its 
energy sector.  However, given India’s increasing dependence on foreign sources for energy 
resources such as oil and gas, the government is concerned about several potential 
developments that could affect India’s access to resources. Political instability in the Middle 
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forum for cooperation on energy matters. India supports the creation of a regional version of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) with the specific goal of improving states’ emergency 
response capabilities to possible future disruptions in supply. Views were mixed about 
whether an energy-specific regional organization would be feasible; it is argued that such 
cooperation seemed ambitious given that more immediate inter-state security issues 
remained unresolved between India and its neighbors. Situated adjacent to the world’s 
largest oil reserves in West Asia and along the route of the bulk of international oil trade 
moving from the Persian Gulf to East Asia and the Pacific, however, India is well placed to 
play a key leadership role in enhancing the "collective energy security" of the Indian Ocean 
Rim (IOR). 
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Fig. 11.2 Scheme of ISETs in CEPS of EA countries 
 
In summer period of electric load decrease, thermal power plants (TPPs) of EPS with winter 
maximum of consumer electric load can be additionally loaded. This additional generation 
can be transmitted to power systems with summer consumer load maximum replacing 
semi-peak TPPs from the balance of capacities there. In winter period, to the contrary, TPPs 
of power system with summer load maximum can be additionally loaded and their 
generation will be transmitted to EPS with winter maximum of consumer load. Thus, 
installed capacity of power plants in power systems with different season maxims can be 
decreased only by commissioning interstate electric ties connecting them. Thus, this 
decrease in each EPS will be approximately equal to an ISET transfer capability. 
 
The effect of interconnecting EPSs with different seasons of load maxims can be used when 
commissioning new capacities. Capacity of a new power plant, commissioned in the 
interconnection of power systems with different seasons of load maxims can be used in 
balances of capacities of both power systems (in one - in summer, in the other - in winter). 
Here each kW of capacity of this plant will substitute up to 2 kW of installed capacities of 
other power plants. This effect can be used when constructing any types of power plants - 
hydraulic, thermal burning fossil fuel, nuclear, tidal (if their power supply is regulated). 
 
Common electric power space should be created based on the following (so far preliminarily 
formulated) principles and required conditions: 
 
1. Attaining energy-economic and environmental efficiency of ISETs, to be constructed 
within CEPS, for all countries-participants. 
2. Maintenance of energy security and accepted levels of power supply reliability of all the 
countries, comprising CEPS.  
3. Joint elaboration by countries-participants of legal, prescriptive and methodological 
grounds for creation, operation and development of CEPS. 
11.4 Prospects of Electricity Infrastructure in East Asia 
The problem of forming interstate electric ties and interconnecting electric power systems of 
countries and regions of East Asia (EA), including Siberia and Far East of Russia, China, 
Mongolia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Republic of Korea (ROK) and 
Japan has attracted ever-greater attention in recent years. There are favorable preconditions 
for electric power cooperation and creation of power interconnection in EA. First of all these 
are: a) uneven distribution of fuel and energy resources (in particular hydro energy) on the 
territory; b) substantial difference in tariffs for electricity in various power systems; c) 
different seasons and hours of annual load maxims in power systems. 
 
Taking into account these factors economic effectiveness and prospects of forming interstate 
electric ties (ISETs) and interconnection of power systems in East Asia have been studied. 
The results of the studies are presented below. 
 
11.4.1 Creation and Development of Common Electric Power Space of EA Countries 
The concept of common electric power space (CEPS) is the basic one for studying interstate 
electric ties and interconnection of electric power systems (EPS) in EA. The following 
definition is suggested. CEPS is a territory interconnected by electric ties and contract agreements for 
mutually beneficial exchange (trade) of electric power (and fuel for power plants). It is kept in mind 
that ISETs and transmission lines in each country create technical infrastructure of CEPS and 
interstate agreements and internal legal acts are economic, financial and legal components of 
CEPS. Figure 11.2 presents block diagram of potential ties, forming CEPS. Formation of 
common electric power space in East Asia is aimed at creation of favorable conditions for: 
 
1. Free and mutually beneficial export-import of electricity and power; 
2. Use of effects of interconnecting national and regional electric power systems. 
 
In this connection CEPS formation is reasonable, on the one hand, owing to different 
natural-climatic and economic conditions of EA countries and, on the other hand, owing to 
substantial energy and economic effects that can be achieved by interconnecting power 
systems of different countries. 
 
Thus, Japan and ROK are insufficiently provided with fuel and energy resources and the 
cost of fuel and energy is high in these countries.  Russia, China and DPRK are provided 
with resources much better but are far behind in capabilities to finance energy development. 
Besides, China has high rates of economy development and growth of electricity demand, 
which causes power supply problems.  All this makes export-import of electric power 
potentially expedient, first of all, export from Russia to the other countries of the region. 
 
As for the effect of interconnecting power systems, it can be particularly great in the 
considered region owing to different seasons (and hours of day) of annual load maxims of 
consumers (based on these maxims the total required installed capacities of power plants and 
their commissioning are determined). In Russia, North EPSs of China, DPRK and Mongolia 
annual load maximum is in winter in the evening hours, and in Japan and ROK - in summer in 
the daytime. A detailed description of effects of interconnecting EPSs with different seasons of 
load maxims is presented in [21].  Their brief description is presented below.   
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Calculations were done based on annual rates of electricity consumption growth assumed 
from [22-25], etc. and presented in Table 11.6. The presented values were rounded off with a 
precision of 0.5%. 
 
In Table 11.7 numerator presents obtained estimates of prospective electricity demand and 
denominator - estimates of free volume of electricity markets through EA countries. The 
largest fraction of electricity demand falls on China. In 2000 its fraction is about 40% and by 
2020 it may reach nearly 60%. Electricity demand of Japan, Republic of Korea and East 
Russia is also substantial. The fraction of DPRK and Mongolia is much smaller.  
 
As is seen from Table 11.7, by 2010 free volume of the electric power markets in the region 
increases reaching 300-550 TWh/year and by 2020 it increases several times more. Like the 
case with electricity demand, the main fraction of market volume belongs to China. 
However it is much greater, being about 80-90%. The role of Japan and ROK is less 
significant. These countries may as well have free volumes of electricity market, reaching 
several hundreds of TWh/year in 2020. 
 
Countries 2000-2010 2010-2020 
 China 6.5-7.0 5.0-6.5 
 Japan 1.5-3.0 1.0-1.5 
 Republic of Korea 3.5-4.5 2.0 
 DPRK 2.5 2.5-3.5 
 Mongolia  2.5 2.5-3.5 
 Eastern Russia 2.5-3.5 3.5-4.5 
Table 11.6 Annual Rates of Electricity Demand Growth of NEA Countries, % 
 
Countries  2010 2020 
North China  910 1050
280 400

  
1550 1950
920 1300

  
North Japan 455 560
10 105

  
495 660
50 205

  
Republic of Korea 310 345
0 35

  
370 415
60 105

  
DPRK 35
5 10  
40
10 15  
Mongolia  3.5
1  
4
1.5  
East Russia 150-160 180-200 
TOTAL 1865 2155
295 550

  
2640 3270
1040 1625

  
Table 11.7 Electricity Demand and Free Volume of Electricity Markets in the NEA Countries, 
TWh/year 
 
4. Formation of bilateral and multilateral commissions (or other bodies) to consider and 
solve the problems of coordinated development and operation of CEPS. 
5. Conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements on conditions and guaranties of 
power supply and exchange between the countries. 
 
Since the interstate electric ties existing in the region are weak, formation of EA CEPS will start 
from the scratch, in fact. Obviously it will proceed by stages, which can be set presumably only. 
 
At the first stage, as one can suppose the ties within Russia, Korea, China, Mongolia and 
Japan will be getting stronger. Then, ISETs connecting East Russia with other EA countries 
are expected to be in place. 
 
On the whole the first stage of CEPS formation will be characterized by the bilateral solving 
the problems of construction and control of power flows for each individual ISET. In fact, at 
the given stage one cannot speak of electric power space in EA countries in the full sense of 
this concept. 
 
The second stage of CEPS formation will start after the constructed ISETs begin to noticeably 
affect energy balances and operating conditions of the interconnected EPSs. Here the power 
flows on individual ISETs can affect operating conditions of several EPSs, shown in Figure 
11.2. There can be transit flows via some countries (for instance, via DPRK from Russia or 
China to Republic of Korea), etc. This will require ISETs construction, effects given by them 
and regimes of power flows to be coordinated at the level of several countries, and later, 
probably at the level of the whole interconnection. 
 
11.4.2 Estimation of Prospective Electricity Demands of NEA Countries  
and Free Volumes of Their Electricity Markets 
Electricity demand of NEA countries was estimated for a time span to 2010-2020.  The 
calculations were done based on the information on levels and rates of power consumption 
in the countries of the region, presented in [22-25]. Taking into account a substantial 
uncertainty of the information the electricity consumption estimates were set by a range. 
 
Free volume of electricity market is considered to mean the part of prospective electricity 
consumption that is not covered by generation of existing and predetermined power plants. 
Predetermined plants are those being constructed or whose construction is decided. 
 
Electricity demand and market volume for China and Japan were so far determined for the 
"Northern" territories only. The "Northern" territories of China include the provinces served 
by power systems of Northeast, North, North-West (including Xinjiang autonomous region) 
and power systems of Shandong province. The "Northern" territories of Japan include 
prefectures served by power systems of Hokkaido, Tohoku and Tokyo, i.e. the whole 50 Hz 
zone of Japanese national electric power system. Electricity demand for Russia was 
determined for its East territories only, including East part of Interconnected EPS (IEPS) of 
Siberia, IEPS of Russian Far East (RFE) and EPS of Sakhalin. The volume of East-Russian 
electricity market was not calculated since, due to available and predetermined power 
plants, Siberia and RFE have surplus capacities for a time span to 2010-2020.  
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and Free Volumes of Their Electricity Markets 
Electricity demand of NEA countries was estimated for a time span to 2010-2020.  The 
calculations were done based on the information on levels and rates of power consumption 
in the countries of the region, presented in [22-25]. Taking into account a substantial 
uncertainty of the information the electricity consumption estimates were set by a range. 
 
Free volume of electricity market is considered to mean the part of prospective electricity 
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Predetermined plants are those being constructed or whose construction is decided. 
 
Electricity demand and market volume for China and Japan were so far determined for the 
"Northern" territories only. The "Northern" territories of China include the provinces served 
by power systems of Northeast, North, North-West (including Xinjiang autonomous region) 
and power systems of Shandong province. The "Northern" territories of Japan include 
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determined for its East territories only, including East part of Interconnected EPS (IEPS) of 
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plants, Siberia and RFE have surplus capacities for a time span to 2010-2020.  
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11.5 Assessment of Energy Supply Systems with an Energy  
Infrastructure Model for Asia   
While energy demands in China, Southeast Asia and East Asia are projected to grow 
substantially over the coming decades, the development and exploitation of energy 
resources in Asia including East Siberia and the Russian Far East have attracted 
considerable attentions. It has become increasingly important to answer the question of 
what energy infrastructure, such as long distance natural gas pipelines and international 
electricity networks, should be constructed in the region, and the question of how their 
energy demands should be satisfied economically, securely and environmentally benignly. 
 
Let us see briefly the outlook of primary energy supplies in Asia. Coal is an abundant and 
broadly distributed fossil fuel in Asia, and is expected to continue to be a major energy 
resource. Although the price of coal per unit calorific value has been relatively inexpensive, 
the growing demands of coal will not be met without the extensive development of its 
transportation infrastructures such as railroads and bulk carriers. In the case of crude oil, the 
amount of its resource in the region is not plentiful as that of coal, and is unevenly 
distributed. Oil supplies for Asia will continue to be increasingly dependent upon the 
Middle East, and such over-dependency of oil procurement on the single geopolitical region 
may potentially aggravate the energy securities of the countries in Asia. Natural gas is a 
clean and high quality fuel. It generates less CO2 than any other fossil fuels on a per calorie 
basis. From the viewpoint of environmental protection, natural gas is the best substitute for 
oil and coal. However, enormous capital investment for its transportation infrastructure of 
liquefied natural gas tankers, liquefaction and re-gasification facilities, as well as, extensive 
pipeline networks in Asia will be required in order to increase its share in total primary 
energy supply.  
 
In response to the above questions, the purpose of the study is to obtain insights into the 
optimal future configuration and operation of Asian energy infrastructure in a long run, and 
also potential roles of emerging energy related new technologies. For this purpose, the 
author’s research group has been developing a large-scale global energy system model, 
which minimizes inter-temporally the sum of the discounted total energy system up until 
the year of 2100 with a dynamic linear-programming technique [28,29]. 
 
11.5.1 Global Energy Infrastructure Model 
 
11.5.1.1 Geographical Coverage and Transportation Network 
The geographical coverage of the energy model is the whole world. The world is 
geographically divided into 54 regions in order to express the detailed regional 
characteristics of socio-economic and geographical conditions. 
 
As seen in Figure 11.3, the model assumes a transportation infrastructure network of 82 nodes. 
 
The bright circle markers in the figure show the geographical location of 54 city nodes that 
represent energy consuming areas of the respective divided world regions. The dark 
rectangle markers indicate the location of 28 energy production nodes that were added to 
the network in order to express remote fuel production sites far from major cities.  
11.4.3 Export Electric Power Projects of East Russia 
At the expected rates of electricity demand growth on the territory served by IEPSs of 
Siberia and RFE there will be underused electric power generation even at a limited number 
of new generating capacities to be commissioned in the nearest future. The magnitude of the 
generation determines minimum potentialities of electric power export to EA countries, 
which requires construction of interstate transmission lines only.  
 
At the same time export potential of Eastern IEPSs of Russia can be substantially increased 
by development and implementation of special export projects envisaging construction of 
electric power sources jointly with transmission lines. 
 
Russian research and design organizations have studied the prospects of developing 
interstate electric ties between EPSs of East Russia and EA countries [26,27], etc. As a result 
potential directions of such ties were revealed and pre-feasibility studies of individual ISETs 
were made. Such export electric power projects are given below. 
 
1. ISET “Bratsk-Beijing”, length – 2600 km, voltage  600 kV, transfer capability – 3 GW, 
transmitting electricity – 18 TWh/year, cost – $ 1.5 Bln. 
2. “Bureysk Hydro – Kharbin”, 700 km,  400 kV, 1 GW, 3 TWh/year, $ 2 Bln. Cost for the 
transmission itself is about $ 250 Mln. The rest cost is for completing the hydropower plant 
construction. 
3.  “RFE – DPRK – ROK”, 1100 km (additionally, transfer capability of 700 km of bulk power 
transmission lines of RFE power systems are needed to be enlarged),  500 kV, 4 GW on the 
section “RFE – DPRK” and 8 GW on the section “DPRK– ROK”, 7 TWh/year, $ 2 Bln. – cost 
for ISET and additionally $ 2.8 Bln. – cost for Primorye Nuclear power plant.  
4. “Sakhalin – Japan”, 470 km,  500 kV, 4 GW, 23 TWh/year, $ 6.7 Bln (including $ 2.6 Bln. – 
cost of transmission and $ 4.1 Bln. – cost of export gas fired power plant on Sakhalin). 
5. “RFE Nuclear – China – ROK”, 2300 km,  500 kV, 2.5 GW, 18 TWh/year, $ 3 Bln. – cost of 
transmission and additionally $ 4 Bln. – cost of the nuclear power plant. 
6. “Uchursk Hydro – China – ROK”, 3500 km,  500 kV, 3.5 GW, 17 TWh/year, $ 4.5 Bln. – 
cost of transmission and additionally $ 6 Bln. – cost of the hydropower plant. 
 
Thus, as a conclusion, we can say following: 
1) Power cooperation of EA countries with formation of common electric power space and 
power interconnection will give substantial energy-economic effects to the countries-
participants. 
2) Creation of interstate power interconnection in EA opens a great market of new electric 
power technologies, in particular, on DC power transmission. 
3) Development of methodology for assessment of ISETs economic effectiveness is 
required, in particular from the viewpoint of investors and potential owners. 
4) Cooperation of efforts of research, design and other concerned power and financial 
organizations and state bodies is required to carry out further studies of interconnecting 
power systems of EA countries. 
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6. “Uchursk Hydro – China – ROK”, 3500 km,  500 kV, 3.5 GW, 17 TWh/year, $ 4.5 Bln. – 
cost of transmission and additionally $ 6 Bln. – cost of the hydropower plant. 
 
Thus, as a conclusion, we can say following: 
1) Power cooperation of EA countries with formation of common electric power space and 
power interconnection will give substantial energy-economic effects to the countries-
participants. 
2) Creation of interstate power interconnection in EA opens a great market of new electric 
power technologies, in particular, on DC power transmission. 
3) Development of methodology for assessment of ISETs economic effectiveness is 
required, in particular from the viewpoint of investors and potential owners. 
4) Cooperation of efforts of research, design and other concerned power and financial 
organizations and state bodies is required to carry out further studies of interconnecting 
power systems of EA countries. 
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Fig. 11.4 Configuration of the energy system of each node of the model 
 
One of the notable features of the model is that it can explicitly analyze the roles of 
processes of CO2 capture and storage in the energy system. As specific measures for CO2 
capture, the model takes into account both chemical absorption from flue gas of thermal 
power plants and physical adsorption from the output gases of fossil fuel reforming 
processes. There are two major methods for CO2 storage: geological storage and ocean 
storage. Geological storage is classified into three types: 1) injection of CO2 into oil wells for 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR) operation; 2) storage of CO2 in depleted natural gas wells; and 
3) storage of CO2 in aquifers. The model takes account of all the CO2 capture and storage 
technologies, and can assess their future potentials by node in the model. 
 
11.5.1.3 Mathematical Formulation 
The model built here is mathematically formulated as a multi-period inter-temporal linear 
optimization problem with linear inequality and equality constraints. The constraints 
represent supply and demand balances of each type of energy carriers by node, energy and 
CO2 balances in various energy conversion processes, and state equations for several inter-
temporal dynamics, such as the depletions of fossil fuel resources and geological CO2 
storage reservoirs’ capacities, the vintage structures of various facilities in the energy system 
and so forth. The objective function of the problem is defined as the sum of the discounted 
total energy system costs distributed over time, which include fuel production costs, 
amortized capital costs, maintenance and operation costs, energy transportation costs, CO2 
capture and storage costs, and energy saving costs measured as the losses of consumer 
                 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11.3 World division framework and transportation network 
 
The nodes are connected with plausible land and/or ocean transportation routes. The model 
takes account of transportations of coal, oil, natural gas, H2, synthetic liquid fuels, captured 
CO2 and electricity. As specific measures for transportation, the model assumes freight 
trains, on-shore and/or offshore pipelines, overhead power transmission lines, submarine 
power cables and various types of ships. The specific capacity and operation of each 
transportation route is determined as the result of minimization of the total energy system 
cost through linear programming. 
 
11.5.1.2 System Structure of the Energy Model 
Figure 11.4 indicates the assumed possible energy flow at each node in this energy model. 
Fossil fuels and biomass gasification, methane synthesis, DME synthesis, methanol 
synthesis, indirect coal liquefaction, H2 production and electric power generation are 
considered as technological options for energy conversion. An elaborate integration of these 
conversion plants together with CO2 capture facilities provides for a large of low carbon-
intensive fuels with little additional CO2 emissions from their conversion processes. Such an 
integrated energy system can be expected to contribute to remarkable reductions in CO2 
emissions from end-use sectors. 
 
With respect to electricity generation sectors, the model explicitly takes into account daily 
load curves expressed simply with three time periods (morning, afternoon and evening) by 
season (summer, winter and intermediate), so as to determine how each type of power plant 
will be operated in accordance with diurnal and seasonal variation of electricity demands 
and renewable supplies. This is because the capacity factors of electric power plants are 
supposed to have a large influence on their economic characteristics. 
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surpluses. The supply cost curves of fossil fuels by node are expressed as step-wise linear 
functions with respect to their amounts of cumulative productions. 
 
The model seeks the optimal regional development paths of the energy-related infrastructure 
for the years from 2000 through 2100, at intervals of 10 years, using a linear-programming 
technique. The model, therefore, does not take into account any nonlinear effects, such as 
economies-of-scale with respect to unit construction costs of various facilities, especially those 
of pipelines. Furthermore, for simplicity, all the variables in the model are treated as 
continuous real numbers, although some of them, such as those expressing the number of 
tankers, should be indeed treated as discrete integer numbers in the real world. 
 
The number of the variables of the model is about one million, and the problem is solved 
with an interior point method of linear programming. This research group uses commercial 
software of CPLEX. 
 
11.5.1.4 Reference Energy Demand Scenario 
The final consumption sector of the model is disaggregated into the following four types of 
secondary energy carriers: 1) gaseous fuel, 2) liquid fuel, 3) solid fuel, and 4) electricity. In 
the case of electricity consumption, as mentioned before, the model explicitly takes into 
account daily load duration curves by season. The future energy consumption in the model 
is exogenously given as reference scenarios by energy carrier type, by node of the network 
and by year.  
 
The future energy demand scenarios in this model are based on SRES B2 scenario that was 
made by IPCC. The amounts of energy consumption by node were principally adjusted by 
demographic data on geographical distribution of national populations in the future. 
 
11.5.2 Simulation Results of the Model 
This Subsection presents some of the simulation results of the energy infrastructure model. 
This study assumes two policy cases for simulation of the model, i.e., a reference case (REF 
case) and a controlled case (CON case). In CON case, the atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
until the year 2100 are limited below 550 ppm, and additionally the annual CO2 emissions of 
each Annex1 country of Kyoto Protocol are assumed to be reduced less than 20% of their 
respect emission levels of 1990 by 2050 and thereafter. No emission trades of greenhouse 
gases were assumed in the simulation. 
 
11.5.2.1 Reference Case Results 
The profile of the world primary energy production in REF Case is shown in Figure 11.5. 
When no CO2 regulation exists, the share of coal in primary energy supply is very large 
because of its low price, and natural gas including unconventional gas is to become the 
second most important primary energy source. World electricity generation is shown in 
Figure 11.6. The share of coal-fired generation is substantially large. Photovoltaics will begin 
to be used practically after 2050, partly because in this model, the unit capital costs of solar 
cells are expected to be reduced by 3.6% per annum until 2050.  
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of pipelines. Furthermore, for simplicity, all the variables in the model are treated as 
continuous real numbers, although some of them, such as those expressing the number of 
tankers, should be indeed treated as discrete integer numbers in the real world. 
 
The number of the variables of the model is about one million, and the problem is solved 
with an interior point method of linear programming. This research group uses commercial 
software of CPLEX. 
 
11.5.1.4 Reference Energy Demand Scenario 
The final consumption sector of the model is disaggregated into the following four types of 
secondary energy carriers: 1) gaseous fuel, 2) liquid fuel, 3) solid fuel, and 4) electricity. In 
the case of electricity consumption, as mentioned before, the model explicitly takes into 
account daily load duration curves by season. The future energy consumption in the model 
is exogenously given as reference scenarios by energy carrier type, by node of the network 
and by year.  
 
The future energy demand scenarios in this model are based on SRES B2 scenario that was 
made by IPCC. The amounts of energy consumption by node were principally adjusted by 
demographic data on geographical distribution of national populations in the future. 
 
11.5.2 Simulation Results of the Model 
This Subsection presents some of the simulation results of the energy infrastructure model. 
This study assumes two policy cases for simulation of the model, i.e., a reference case (REF 
case) and a controlled case (CON case). In CON case, the atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
until the year 2100 are limited below 550 ppm, and additionally the annual CO2 emissions of 
each Annex1 country of Kyoto Protocol are assumed to be reduced less than 20% of their 
respect emission levels of 1990 by 2050 and thereafter. No emission trades of greenhouse 
gases were assumed in the simulation. 
 
11.5.2.1 Reference Case Results 
The profile of the world primary energy production in REF Case is shown in Figure 11.5. 
When no CO2 regulation exists, the share of coal in primary energy supply is very large 
because of its low price, and natural gas including unconventional gas is to become the 
second most important primary energy source. World electricity generation is shown in 
Figure 11.6. The share of coal-fired generation is substantially large. Photovoltaics will begin 
to be used practically after 2050, partly because in this model, the unit capital costs of solar 
cells are expected to be reduced by 3.6% per annum until 2050.  
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natural gas, its transportation cost is relatively high, and its international markets are 
divided into several local markets by continent. An increased reliance on natural gas would 
provide countries with more geographically diversified energy supply structures, thus 
improving the securities for their energy procurement. 
 
 
Fig. 11.9 Natural gas production and transportation of 2050 in REF case 
 
Asia. In REF case, the necessity of the development of region-wide electricity grids among 
Northeast Asian countries does not seem apparent in the model result. The model indicates 
that transporting those fuels by rail or pipeline and generating electricity close to the energy 
consuming cities seems to be more economical than generating electricity at mine mouth or 
wellhead and transmitting electricity for a long distance by power transmission line. 
Obviously, the results are highly dependent upon the assumption about the relative cost 
competitiveness of power transmission lines against other types of energy transporting 
measures.  
 
11.5.2.2 Controlled Case Results 
In CON case, energy conservation, fuel switching, and CO2 capture and storage leads to 
significant CO2 emission reduction. The fuel switching means changing high carbon content 
fuels, like coal, to less carbonintensive fuels, like natural gas. World electric generation in 
Regulation Case is shown in Figure 11.10. The share of coal-fired generation is reduced and 
the share of natural gas-fired generation is increasing. Additionally coal-fired generation is 
changed to IGCC that enables us to conduct CO2 capture more efficiently.  
 
In CON case, the extensive international power transmission network around Japan can be 
seen in the figure for the year 2050. A very stringent CO2 emission control policy may 
enhance significantly the economic viability of imported electricity from Sakhalin Island and 
the Korean Peninsula for Japanese power market. 
 
Fig. 11.7 Coal production and transportation of 2050 in REF case 
 
 
Fig. 11.8 Oil production and transportation of 2050 in REF case 
 
The calculated global patterns of coal, oil and natural gas productions and transportations 
for the year 2050 are shown in Figures 11.7, 11.8 and 11.9, respectively. The cost of coal land 
transport by rail is rather expensive, and most of coal for international market trades is 
therefore transported by ship. North America and South Africa are expected to be large coal 
producing regions. In the case of oil, its costs for both land and ocean transportations are 
relatively low. This means that one single world region can provide oil resources 
economically for the rest of the world via its international market trades. The Middle East is 
therefore expected to continue to be a major oil-exporting region over the century. As for 
www.intechopen.com
Electricity Infrastructure in Asian Region and Energy Security Problems 443
natural gas, its transportation cost is relatively high, and its international markets are 
divided into several local markets by continent. An increased reliance on natural gas would 
provide countries with more geographically diversified energy supply structures, thus 
improving the securities for their energy procurement. 
 
 
Fig. 11.9 Natural gas production and transportation of 2050 in REF case 
 
Asia. In REF case, the necessity of the development of region-wide electricity grids among 
Northeast Asian countries does not seem apparent in the model result. The model indicates 
that transporting those fuels by rail or pipeline and generating electricity close to the energy 
consuming cities seems to be more economical than generating electricity at mine mouth or 
wellhead and transmitting electricity for a long distance by power transmission line. 
Obviously, the results are highly dependent upon the assumption about the relative cost 
competitiveness of power transmission lines against other types of energy transporting 
measures.  
 
11.5.2.2 Controlled Case Results 
In CON case, energy conservation, fuel switching, and CO2 capture and storage leads to 
significant CO2 emission reduction. The fuel switching means changing high carbon content 
fuels, like coal, to less carbonintensive fuels, like natural gas. World electric generation in 
Regulation Case is shown in Figure 11.10. The share of coal-fired generation is reduced and 
the share of natural gas-fired generation is increasing. Additionally coal-fired generation is 
changed to IGCC that enables us to conduct CO2 capture more efficiently.  
 
In CON case, the extensive international power transmission network around Japan can be 
seen in the figure for the year 2050. A very stringent CO2 emission control policy may 
enhance significantly the economic viability of imported electricity from Sakhalin Island and 
the Korean Peninsula for Japanese power market. 
 
Fig. 11.7 Coal production and transportation of 2050 in REF case 
 
 
Fig. 11.8 Oil production and transportation of 2050 in REF case 
 
The calculated global patterns of coal, oil and natural gas productions and transportations 
for the year 2050 are shown in Figures 11.7, 11.8 and 11.9, respectively. The cost of coal land 
transport by rail is rather expensive, and most of coal for international market trades is 
therefore transported by ship. North America and South Africa are expected to be large coal 
producing regions. In the case of oil, its costs for both land and ocean transportations are 
relatively low. This means that one single world region can provide oil resources 
economically for the rest of the world via its international market trades. The Middle East is 
therefore expected to continue to be a major oil-exporting region over the century. As for 
www.intechopen.com
Electricity Infrastructures in the Global Marketplace444
are adhered to, which are high security of the power grid, unification and entirety of 
planning, combination of short-term and long-term planning, moderately advanced 
construction, and advanced technology. In this Section, from the point of power system 
planning, future development of the China power grid is introduced; the planning of a 
nationwide power grid, and related problems are discussed based on current power grid 
structures [30]. 
 
11.6.1 The Current Situation of China Power Grid 
Up to 2003, total installed capacity in China was about 391,400MW with yearly generation of 
1.9×1012kWh. Six regional power grids were established as shown in Figure 11.11. They are: 
East-North China power grid, North China power grid, West-North China power grid, East 
China power grid, Central China power and South China power grid. The main frame of the 
power network in East-North China, North China, Central China, East China and South 
China power grid is 500kV and 220kV transmission lines except that in West-North China 
power grid it is 750kV and 330kV transmission lines. Up to the year 2003, total length of 
transmission lines above 220kV was about 2.1×105km and total capacity of transformers 
above 220kV was about 588GVA.  
 
Currently, two 500kV AC lines, forming a large synchronous interconnected grid, 
interconnect the East-North China and North China power grids and there are two ±500kV 
HVDC transmission lines that have combined transmission capacity of 4200MW from the 
Central China power grid to the East China power grid.     
 
 
Fig. 11.11 Diagram of china power grid and energy resources distributions 
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Thus, the purpose of the study was to obtain the insights into the possible future 
configuration and operation of energy infrastructure in Asia where energy demands are 
rapidly growing. This study presented the outline of the energy system model built in the 
study, and showed a part of the results obtained. Bearing in mind the considerable 
uncertainties as to various assumptions made in the model, the simulation results indicate 
that the economic validity of the development of region-wide electricity grids among 
Northeast Asian countries does not necessarily seem obvious in REF case. The current 
energy model cannot take account of the influences of energy security issues explicitly. It is 
necessary to conduct extensive sensitivity analyses to derive a general conclusion to the 
topic. 
 
This study has not yet been completed, and the following research topics are to be 
incorporated in future studies, i.e. further improvement of the accuracy of the data on fossil 
fuel resources and production costs, sensitivity analyses of future energy demand scenarios, 
and consideration of nonlinear effects of infrastructure, such as economies-of-scale. 
 
11.6 China Power Grid and its Future Development  
Over decades, the China power grid has experienced a long developing process, from 
individual-provincial networks to across provincial power networks and to the current 
regional-interconnected power grid. This general development process of the electrical 
system has been driven by the pursuit of optimal utilization of energy resources on a 
nationwide scale. This is also impetus to future development of the China power grid. A 
feasible power network configuration is basic for secure and stable system operation, and 
power network planning has always emphasized the overall sense and combination of 
short- and long-term considerations. In the planning of a nationwide power grid, principles 
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Regional power grids with a large amount of power transmitted to other areas by HVDC lines 
are therefore suggested in creation of independent synchronous systems. 
 
Considering feasibility of technology and the economy, a structure with 4 to 5 synchronous 
power grids in China is acceptable. By year 2010, the East-North China, North China and East 
China power grids will be interconnected by AC lines and form a large synchronous power grid. 
 
The Central China, West-North China and South China power grids are independent 
synchronous power grids, and are interconnected with other synchronous power grids by 
HVDC lines. By the year 2020, the basic structure of a nationwide power grid will be similar; 
the large synchronous power grids including East-North China, North China and East 
China may be divided into two synchronous grids or not changed, which will be decided by 
development of the inner network in each region. The possibility of converting AC 
interconnections to Back-to-Back DC connections exists between the East-North China and 
North China power grid and the North China and East China power grid. Under this basic 
structure of a nationwide power grid, the transient stability, power transfer ability, and 
power supply reliability of the whole system is improved.  
 
11.6.3 Specific Problems Concerned in National-Wide Power Grid 
As introduced above, in near future, the relationship between different regional grids will 
become more complex and tight. A change in one area may influence system stability in a 
large area. System simulations are being undertaken comprehensively to study stability of a 
nationwide power grid for year 2010 and year 2020. The simulation results show that for the 
power grid structure of year 2010, the system may remain stable under “n-1” contingencies. 
Further, the system may remain stable under “n-2” contingencies by applying measures 
such as disconnecting machines, bipole converter blocking on HVDC lines, and loss of two 
main AC transmission lines. In year 2020, the inner structure of each regional grid and the 
connection between synchronous grids will be strengthened, which leads to a result that the 
stability level of the whole system increases a lot. For the power grid structure of year 2020, 
the system may remain stable under almost all “n-2” contingencies. 
 
Besides ability of the system to remain in synchronism in nationwide power grid planning, 
several other specific problems are being examined. 
 
11.6.3.1 Low Frequency Oscillation 
Low frequency oscillation is one of the important stability problems in weak-connected 
power systems. If the oscillation is strong, the transient transmission ability of the 
transmission lines or generators will be decreased. In the worst case, the reliability of the 
whole system will be impaired. From the calculations, some modes of low frequency 
oscillations are found. In the large synchronous power grid, the East-North China and 
North China and East China power grid, East-North China region and part of North China 
region have low frequency oscillation at about 0.19Hz relative to East China region and 
inner part of East China regional system.  
And in the North China regional system, there are low frequency oscillations between 
different parts of system. In the Central China power grid, the oscillation is at about 0.23 to 
In recent years, unexpectedly rapid economic developments have caused a power supply 
crisis in China. The crisis was exacerbated by coal supply shortages and drought together 
with high summer temperatures, and the crisis induced extended rolling brownouts and 
blackouts. Under this situation, construction of new generation capacity and transmission 
facilities became urgent and necessary to resolve the power supply crisis within two or three 
years. With respect to planning of the future power grid, optimal and maximum utilization 
of energy resources are being given special attention. 
 
11.6.2 Planning of Nationwide Interconnected Power Grid 
China is abundant in coal and hydro resources, but 80% of coal reserves are in the north and 
northwest China, and over 80% of hydro resources are in the west region. The power 
consumption of the east and coastal region is over 60% while the coal resources there are 
only 10% and hydro resources are only 14%. The uneven distribution of energy resources 
and its economic location has required transmitting power from the west to east, which is 
called “West-to-East Electricity Transmitting”. A brief indication of the hydro and coal 
distribution in China is also shown in Figure 11.11. 
 
The nationwide interconnected power grid mainly comprises three west-to-east electricity-
transmitting channels, termed the North Channel, the Central Channel and the South 
Channel. The North Channel consists of two parts. The first is to exploit coal resources in 
west Inner Mongolia and Shanxi and build AC lines to transmit electrical power to Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei and Shangdong. The second is to exploit coal resources in north Shanxi, 
hydropower and thermal power in west-north China and to transmit power to Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei and Shangdong by AC lines or DC lines. The central channel is to develop 
large hydropower stations along Jinsha River, Yalong River and Dadu River and build AC 
and DC lines to transmit power to East China, Central China and South China. The south 
channel is to exploit hydro and coal power in Yunnan and Guizhou, and transmit the 
electricity to Guangdong and Guangxi through AC or DC lines. From electricity demand 
forecasts and analyses, the total amount of power to be transmitted from west to east will be 
about 58,000MW, and will reach about 130,000MW in year 2020. 
 
In respect to power transmission between the different regional power grids, a nationwide 
interconnected power grid would be established by year 2010. By 2020, interconnection 
between the regional power grids would be strengthened, and a higher voltage power grid 
will start to be built. Comprehensive planning and research in the structure of a nationwide 
power grid has been undertaken in the past few years. On deciding the number and scale of 
the synchronous grids, the following technical problems are under consideration: influence to 
transfer ability of key transmitting paths, ability of the system to withstand severe system 
faults, transient stability of the whole system, and adaptability to future development. Another 
consideration for the scale of the synchronous grid is to avoid “strong DC and week AC 
interconnection”. That means avoiding the amount of transmitted power through HVDC 
interconnection lines if it is larger than that through AC interconnection lines between two 
regional power grids. Large scale loop structure must also be avoided, because in emergency 
cases, the loss of HVDC lines in “strong DC and weak AC interconnection” structures or main AC 
interconnection lines in loop structure will cause a large amount of power transfer that would 
threaten the receiving system. In the worst case, this could induce blackout in a large area. 
www.intechopen.com
Electricity Infrastructure in Asian Region and Energy Security Problems 447
Regional power grids with a large amount of power transmitted to other areas by HVDC lines 
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power supply reliability of the whole system is improved.  
 
11.6.3 Specific Problems Concerned in National-Wide Power Grid 
As introduced above, in near future, the relationship between different regional grids will 
become more complex and tight. A change in one area may influence system stability in a 
large area. System simulations are being undertaken comprehensively to study stability of a 
nationwide power grid for year 2010 and year 2020. The simulation results show that for the 
power grid structure of year 2010, the system may remain stable under “n-1” contingencies. 
Further, the system may remain stable under “n-2” contingencies by applying measures 
such as disconnecting machines, bipole converter blocking on HVDC lines, and loss of two 
main AC transmission lines. In year 2020, the inner structure of each regional grid and the 
connection between synchronous grids will be strengthened, which leads to a result that the 
stability level of the whole system increases a lot. For the power grid structure of year 2020, 
the system may remain stable under almost all “n-2” contingencies. 
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whole system will be impaired. From the calculations, some modes of low frequency 
oscillations are found. In the large synchronous power grid, the East-North China and 
North China and East China power grid, East-North China region and part of North China 
region have low frequency oscillation at about 0.19Hz relative to East China region and 
inner part of East China regional system.  
And in the North China regional system, there are low frequency oscillations between 
different parts of system. In the Central China power grid, the oscillation is at about 0.23 to 
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of energy resources are being given special attention. 
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northwest China, and over 80% of hydro resources are in the west region. The power 
consumption of the east and coastal region is over 60% while the coal resources there are 
only 10% and hydro resources are only 14%. The uneven distribution of energy resources 
and its economic location has required transmitting power from the west to east, which is 
called “West-to-East Electricity Transmitting”. A brief indication of the hydro and coal 
distribution in China is also shown in Figure 11.11. 
 
The nationwide interconnected power grid mainly comprises three west-to-east electricity-
transmitting channels, termed the North Channel, the Central Channel and the South 
Channel. The North Channel consists of two parts. The first is to exploit coal resources in 
west Inner Mongolia and Shanxi and build AC lines to transmit electrical power to Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei and Shangdong. The second is to exploit coal resources in north Shanxi, 
hydropower and thermal power in west-north China and to transmit power to Beijing, 
Tianjin, Hebei and Shangdong by AC lines or DC lines. The central channel is to develop 
large hydropower stations along Jinsha River, Yalong River and Dadu River and build AC 
and DC lines to transmit power to East China, Central China and South China. The south 
channel is to exploit hydro and coal power in Yunnan and Guizhou, and transmit the 
electricity to Guangdong and Guangxi through AC or DC lines. From electricity demand 
forecasts and analyses, the total amount of power to be transmitted from west to east will be 
about 58,000MW, and will reach about 130,000MW in year 2020. 
 
In respect to power transmission between the different regional power grids, a nationwide 
interconnected power grid would be established by year 2010. By 2020, interconnection 
between the regional power grids would be strengthened, and a higher voltage power grid 
will start to be built. Comprehensive planning and research in the structure of a nationwide 
power grid has been undertaken in the past few years. On deciding the number and scale of 
the synchronous grids, the following technical problems are under consideration: influence to 
transfer ability of key transmitting paths, ability of the system to withstand severe system 
faults, transient stability of the whole system, and adaptability to future development. Another 
consideration for the scale of the synchronous grid is to avoid “strong DC and week AC 
interconnection”. That means avoiding the amount of transmitted power through HVDC 
interconnection lines if it is larger than that through AC interconnection lines between two 
regional power grids. Large scale loop structure must also be avoided, because in emergency 
cases, the loss of HVDC lines in “strong DC and weak AC interconnection” structures or main AC 
interconnection lines in loop structure will cause a large amount of power transfer that would 
threaten the receiving system. In the worst case, this could induce blackout in a large area. 
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±600kV) in China. For the receiving-end, there would be several HVDC converter stations in 
relatively small areas. The high density of DC converter stations will influence operating 
reliability in converters. For example, 8 DC converter stations are planned in the east China 
area, mainly around Shanghai. Because the interrelationships between multiple converters 
may induce failure in commutation and sub synchronous oscillation (that have appeared in 
some HVDC systems in the world), security of multi-infeed HVDC systems is being given 
great attention and study, and detailed electromagnetic transient simulations are required. 
 
11.6.4 Future Development of China Power Grid 
Currently, the study of ultra high voltage AC transmission system (1000kV or 1150kV) and 
DC transmission line (±750kV or ±800kV) are initiated for future power grid development. 
The higher voltage power grid based on the 500kV nationwide power grid will be 
tentatively built near year 2020 as a long-term plan. 
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0.25Hz between the west and east part of the system. Because the damping capability is 
acceptable and sufficient to restrain the oscillation, the problem is not very severe, but for 
reliability and stability of system operation, installation of PSS for generators is emphasized. 
These are currently installed for most of the generators but not enabled. 
 
11.6.3.2 Stability of Receiving Systems 
Pear River Delta, Yangtze River Delta and Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area are economical-
developed districts. Hence, they are load centers, the “East” in the “West to East Electricity 
Transmitting” project. The proportion of imported power to maximum load is relatively 
high. Take Beijing-Tianjin-Heibei load center for example; in year 2010, the proportion of 
imported power to the maximum load is about 36%, and that in year 2020 it is near 50%. 
With such a large amount of imported power, influences to stability of the receiving systems 
become complex and difficult to control. Specific research on this topic is taking place and 
some guidelines are being drawn for the planning of the receiving systems. 
 
(a) Optimizing of receiving-end network structure: Most load centers in China have ring 
network structure to ensure reliability of power supply. With increase of imported power, 
requirements for a feasible and rational receiving-end system become higher. In the 
planning stage, the length of the ring and the layout of substations should be considered 
from a longer-point of view to have good adaptability to long-term development. The 
network structure should be simple and clear, and optimizing adjustments should be kept 
with the whole power grid development. 
 
(b) The transmission paths to the receiving system should be independent and dispersed, if 
conditions allow, and the amount of transmitted power to the load center in each 
transmission path should be limited to a certain percent, which is 10~15% in China. So that, 
in the most severe case of losing the whole transmission path, loss of transmitted power 
would not cause stability problems in the receiving system. 
 
(c) Receiving systems should have enough reacting power support, including static reactive 
power and dynamic reactive power. As known, lack of reactive power support is one of the 
most important reasons for voltage instability; it has been given more and more attention in 
recent years. Since reactive power is not generally transmitted during normal operation, the 
receiving systems have to supply enough reactive power to correspond to their imported 
active power. Capacitors and generators are traditional means for static and dynamic 
reactive power support. It is required that newly added generators must follow the so called 
“Layered and zoned” principle in China, that is to ensure local dynamic power in receiving 
systems, and the power factor of new generation should be 0.85. Besides, FACTS devices as 
an advanced technology for power system stability are highly recommended in the future 
power system. 
 
11.6.3.3 Security of Multi-in Feed HVDC Systems 
HVDC technology is being applied widely in the “West-to-East Electricity Transmitting” 
project, mainly for large hydro power stations to transfer power to load centers. As 
planning, in year 2020, there would be about 22 HVDC transmission projects (±500kV and 
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±600kV) in China. For the receiving-end, there would be several HVDC converter stations in 
relatively small areas. The high density of DC converter stations will influence operating 
reliability in converters. For example, 8 DC converter stations are planned in the east China 
area, mainly around Shanghai. Because the interrelationships between multiple converters 
may induce failure in commutation and sub synchronous oscillation (that have appeared in 
some HVDC systems in the world), security of multi-infeed HVDC systems is being given 
great attention and study, and detailed electromagnetic transient simulations are required. 
 
11.6.4 Future Development of China Power Grid 
Currently, the study of ultra high voltage AC transmission system (1000kV or 1150kV) and 
DC transmission line (±750kV or ±800kV) are initiated for future power grid development. 
The higher voltage power grid based on the 500kV nationwide power grid will be 
tentatively built near year 2020 as a long-term plan. 
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